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The purpose of this thesis is to explore the role of external support for 
insurgencies, with particular emphasis on the Islamic State (IS). The research evaluates 
such support during the French–Algerian War, the Vietnam War, and the current war 
with IS utilizing a model from a 2001 RAND book titled Trends in Outside Support for 
Insurgent Movements. The book identifies the following external support elements: safe 
haven and transit, financial resources, political support, propaganda, and direct military 
support. As this analysis will show, indirect military support (unintentional and or 
unknowing) is just as relevant today as direct military support. This thesis identifies 
patterns and vulnerabilities of external support for IS and assesses the current relevance 
of the 2001 model outlined in the RAND book. Analysis of three case studies reveals 
continuity among all three in patterns and areas of vulnerability regarding safe haven and 
transit, financial resources, and propaganda; political and direct military support appear 
to be less relevant to IS than to prior insurgencies. The current information era, dispersed 
support, the role of natural resources, and non-state actors have changed the profile of 
external support for insurgencies today. This thesis recommends improving the condition 
of fragile states to prevent safe havens for IS, reclaiming territory from IS, and 
implementing UN sanctions to cease IS financial support. Political pressure and the 
elimination of non-state support could also deter states from directly or indirectly 
supporting IS. Further, IS propaganda could be diminished through a global 
antipropaganda campaign. Finally, strengthening alliances could prevent state and non-
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Non-state actors have become a growing concern over the last few decades. Non-
state actors who are striving to gain territory are also referred to as insurgents; those who 
are more concerned with spreading fear along with their messages are referred to as 
terrorists. The non-state actor Islamic State (IS) is the most recent Middle East extremist 
group. IS has expanded throughout Iraq and Syria and created havoc for many. From 
2014 to 2015, IS’s presence increased at an alarming rate, partly because as an 
organization it has successfully learned from prior extremist movements and constantly 
adapts and has gained international support. However, very little thorough research has 
been conducted on IS’s external support structure.  
I analyzed IS through the lens of a small number of theories about external 
support, using books, academic journals, news articles, and reports from 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and governmental organizations. Bruce J. Reider 
from Small Wars Journal defined external support as “any form of support provided to an 
insurgent force outside the political boundaries of the insurgency.”1 The purpose of this 
research is to aid global efforts to predict and identify key variables of vulnerability for 
IS’s external support network. In order to develop a more peaceful Middle East and 
alleviate a global extremist threat, nations must refine techniques to remove current 
threats and to support proxy interdictions. 
A. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the current trends in IS’s external support 
structure. Using a model of external support to insurgencies presented by RAND’s book 
titled Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, this thesis compiles in-depth 
case studies of the French–Algerian War, the Vietnam War, and IS. The first two case 
studies were chosen because they involved the U.S. and France, in different geographic 
locations confronted by weaker insurgencies that eventually succeeded. The final case 
                                                 
1 Bruce J. Reider, “External Support to Insurgencies,” Small Wars Journal (October 2014): 2. 
 2 
study, IS was chosen to help the U.S. best eliminate external support for this current 
insurgency. This thesis then assesses the ways the major external supports for 
insurgences have changed, before finally determining patterns, areas of vulnerability, and 
relevance of the RAND model for understanding and countering IS.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
My research in this thesis will approach the following questions. 
1. Can the French–Algerian War and the Vietnam War help identify patterns 
and areas of vulnerability in the external support IS currently receives? 
2. Are the five external support elements discussed in this thesis (safe haven 
and transit, financial resources, political support, propaganda, and direct 
[to indirect] military support) still relevant to modern non-state actors like 
IS?  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Changes in U.S. doctrine over the past 13 years have laid the groundwork for new 
strategies focusing on proxy wars and smaller-scale approaches to terrorism. These 
changes to doctrine support indirect efforts, including disrupting external support 
networks. The national security strategy (NSS) of the United States of America has 
changed drastically between the last two presidential administrations in terms of how it 
aims to deter and defeat the constant global terrorist threat. The September 2002 U.S. 
NSS focused on developing international relations and institutions and on confronting 
terrorist threats in their homelands, no longer considering deterrence a viable strategy 
against extremists. The same U.S. NSS was “centered on a new Department of Homeland 
Security and [included] a new unified military command and a fundamental reordering of 
the FBI,” along with public- and private-sector support to defeat global terrorism.2 
The February 2015 U.S. NSS shifted the global strategy on terrorism to sustain 
prolonged operations. The new U.S. NSS transitions the U.S. from full-scale military 
assaults toward proxy wars to support sustained operations. Rather than eliminating 
threats through direct conflicts, the U.S. will work to counter the ideology and narratives 
                                                 
2 The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” Washington, DC, 
September 2002, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf 
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of global extremists, in this case to degrade and defeat IS. Countering IS’s ideology and 
root cause will involve sponsoring weak states through strengthening their militaries, 
developing institutions, and supporting freedom and free trade, along with the 
international community’s support to build global counterterrorism coalitions.3  
1. Useful Theories 
Theories on external support for insurgencies in general can provide tools to 
analyze how external support networks function for IS specifically. This thesis will use 
several such theories to understand IS’s global support networks. The article “External 
Support to Insurgency” by Bruce J. Reider displays several key considerations when 
evaluating an insurgency’s external network. Reider’s thesis defined the importance of 
external support: 
external support is a decisive factor in determining the outcome of an 
insurgency and identifies the need for development of a comprehensive 
counterinsurgent response theory aimed at isolating the insurgent using the 
diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of national 
power.4 
The author describes how insurgents can receive either active or passive support.5 Both 
of these can support the longevity of an insurgency operation. 
Also useful here are the article “External Assistance: Enabler of Insurgent 
Success” and the book Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win, both by Jeffrey Record. 
In his article, Record explains how external assistance could be the tipping factor for 
decisive victory for an insurgency, stating it “can alter the insurgent-government power 
ratio even to the point where the insurgency becomes the stronger side.”6 In Beating 
Goliath, Record reviewed 11 insurgency wars from 1775 to 2007 to identify how the 
                                                 
3 The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” Washington, DC, 
February 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf 
4 Reider, “External Support to Insurgencies,” 1. 
5 Ibid., 2. 
6 Jeffrey Record, “External Assistance: Enabler of Insurgent Success,” Strategic Studies Institute, 
2006, 36, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/06autumn/record.pdf 
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weak can win. Record concluded that external assistance has a direct connection with an 
insurgency’s success but also recognized that other variables such as determination, 
strategy, and strength of the opposing government play significant roles in conflict 
outcome.7  
The 2006 article “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines 
and the Indirect Approach,” by Colonel Gregory Wilson, U.S. Army, described how the 
Philippine government used the McCormick diamond (Figure 1) to defeat an insurgency 
movement. The McCormick diamond model was developed by Gordon McCormick 
while he was working at Naval Postgraduate School. The McCormick diamond primarily 
focuses on the internal environment or population and states that “population support [is] 
the center of gravity.”8 However, the model also takes into account the external 
environment, which includes international actors who can provide support for an 
insurgency operation. The McCormick diamond focuses on simultaneously employing 
diplomacy and attacking the insurgents’ international support to permanently remove any 
external support.9 While most theses focus on the internal environment, Legs 1–3 in the 
diamond model, this thesis will use the lower half of the McCormick diamond to evaluate 
the external support elements of IS, concentrating on Leg 5.  
                                                 
7 Jeffrey Record, Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 
2007), 1–180, Kindle edition. 
8 Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect 




Figure 1.  McCormick’s Diamond Model.10 
The 2001 RAND book titled Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, 
by Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Brannan explains the major components of an 
external support network for an insurgency, stating that external support originates from 
state or non-state sources, including diaspora sources and refugee sources.11 The five 
major categories of external support are safe haven and transit, financial resources, 
political support, propaganda, and direct military support.12 This thesis will use these 
five categories to present an analysis of IS’s situation in the bottom half of the 
McCormick diamond. The book also concludes that analysis must not solely consider the 
traditional country-based focus when determining the threat; rather, it must incorporate 
the host country’s government strength, the overall balance of forces, and any other 
pertinent factors that could affect the conflict outcome.13 Therefore, this thesis will 
consider as many of these factors as possible in its analysis. 
                                                 
10 Source: Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation,” 4. 
11 Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2001), v–vi. 
12 Ibid., 84–91. 
13 Ibid., 107. 
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2. Overview of External Support 
A review of background information on the Islamic State is necessary to see the 
big picture and understand the role of external support to their overall operations. IS has 
received either direct or indirect assistance from state and non-state actors, which 
diversifies its support structure, making it difficult to target. Direct support is considered 
support that is intentionally contributed, and indirect support is considered unintentional 
and or unknowing.  
The 2001 RAND Corporation book on insurgency external support divided 
external support into two categories: human requirements and material requirements, 
with the category “human requirements” accounting for both political and propaganda 
support.14 Though the book grouped these two support sources into this single category, 
this thesis will consider them separately. Human requirement support is normally easier 
to procure than material support and therefore normally in place first. Political support 
involves outside state support and international leverage to help promote a non-state’s 
legitimacy.15 The U.S. Army’s May 2014 document Insurgencies and Countering 
Insurgencies defined propaganda as the most valuable tool for insurgencies—through 
mass messages, non-state actors gain political and population support while destroying 
the state’s legitimate narrative.16 Propaganda needs to be delivered on both a micro and a 
macro level to increase legitimacy, funding, and recruitment, internationalize an armed 
conflict, and stigmatize the opposing state.  
The category “material requirements” accounts for safe haven and transit, along 
with financial and direct military support.17 Safe haven and transit can provide, protect, 
and promote propaganda expansion, along with supporting training, planning, staging, 
                                                 
14 Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 84–91. 
15 Ibid., 88–89. 
16 Department of the Army, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (FM 3–24 MCWP 3–33.5) 
(Washington, DC, 2014), 73–74. 
17 Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 84. 
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and resting areas imperative for operations.18 Financial support is vital in order to 
purchase weapons, bribe key personnel, pay individuals, and develop and deliver 
propaganda. These funds may be obtained through extortion, ransom, donations, or 
selling of natural resources or lucrative items on the black market, along with direct state 
or non-state assistance.19 Finally, direct state military support can foster large 
conventional attacks and normally unattainable insurgency operations, due to states being 
better equipped and organized.20 Direct state support can easily turn an intrastate conflict 
into an interstate conflict.  
3. Case Studies 
Examples of insurgencies and counterinsurgency efforts from other historical 
contexts can illustrate the influence of external support and how sustaining that support 
can prolong an insurgency operation. Conversely, when external support is disrupted, it 
will most likely lead to the defeat of the insurgency. The first external support case study 
this thesis looks at is the Algerian Revolution (1954–1962). The Front de Libération 
Nationale (FLN) insurgents acquired adequate support from financial resources to 
military arms, along with state support.21 The French recognized this and decided to seal 
the border. This took about a year and removed approximately 90 percent of the 
insurgency’s external support structure, eventually giving the French Army superiority 
over the FLN at that point in the war.22 However, this was undermined when the French 
government gave autonomous authority to the French Army in Algeria. This led to 
suspected war crimes, and France began losing political support for the war. Ultimately, 
France acknowledged the independence of Algeria in 1962.  
The second case this thesis will evaluate is the U.S. Vietnam War, to varying 
degrees, lasted from 1955–1975 against the North Vietnamese. The North Vietnamese 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 86. 
19 Ibid., 87–88. 
20 Ibid., 92–93. 
21 Reider, External Support to Insurgencies, 3. 
22 Ibid., 3. 
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were receiving supplies, weapons, ammunition, training, and sanctuary through the 
Soviet Union, People’s Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, Cuba, Laos, and 
Cambodia. The U.S. attempted several times to secure the borders between North and 
South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, but unsuccessfully. The U.S. also began to lose 
political support for the war domestically. This eventually contributes to a U.S. defeat as 
North Vietnam continued to receive external support.23  
For both the Algerian Revolution and the U.S. Vietnam War, this thesis reviewed 
multiple sources for information. Some of the sources used in discussing the Vietnam 
War include External Support to Insurgency, by Bruce J. Reider; The Story Behind the 
McNamara Line, by Peter Brush; and The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy 
and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia, by Donald W. Hamilton. Some of the 
sources on the Algerian Revolution include A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962, 
by Alistair Horne; and The Social Origins of the French Capitulation in Algeria, by Gil 
Merom.  
  
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
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II. CASE STUDIES 
A. FRENCH–ALGERIAN WAR 
The French–Algerian War case study will help to identify trends in external 
insurgency support by evaluating how an insurgency within Algeria managed to resist 
France. This case study will first provide a brief background of the French–Algerian War 
and then will evaluate the five types of external support proposed in the RAND book—
safe haven and transit, financial resources, political support, propaganda, and direct 
military support—and how the FLN received or did not receive these forms of support 
throughout the war.24 
1. French–Algerian War Background 
Algeria began to gain international attention from Europe and the United States in 
the early 19th century.25 In 1830, the region seemed susceptible to invasion, and the 
French invaded the same year and colonized Algeria, implementing a French constitution 
there in 1848.26 France divided Algeria into three regions for governing purposes: 
Algiers, Oran, and Constantine.27 Shortly thereafter, many Europeans began to settle in 
these regions. The Crémieux Decree of 1870 granted French citizenship to Jews within 
Algeria, but denied French citizenship to Muslim Arabs and Berbers.28 This distinction in 
citizenship began the tensions within Algeria for independence. 
The lack of civil equality for Muslims living in Algeria became another major 
grievance. Documents show that in 1892, 2.5 million francs were allotted for educating 
European children, while only 450,000 francs were dedicated to educating the illiterate 
                                                 
24 Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 1–138. 
25 Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace 1954–1962 (New York: NYRB Classics, 2006), Chapter 1, 
Kindle edition. 
26 Melvin E. Page, ed., Colonialism: An International Social, Cultural, and Political Encyclopedia, 
(Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003), 3:130. 
27 Jean-Denis G. G. Lepage, The French Foreign Legion: An Illustrated History (Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland & Company, Inc., 2007), 6. 
28 Horne, A Savage War of Peace, Chapter 2. 
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Muslim children in Algeria. By 1945, “200,000 [European] children [were being 
educated in] 1,400 primary schools, [while] 1,250,000 [Muslim] children [were allotted 
only] 699 primary schools.”29 Land ownership in Algeria became another source of 
turmoil in the Muslim community. The grape phylloxera in the mid-19th century, which 
destroyed many vineyards in Europe and particularly in France, contributed to French 
farmers moving to Algeria. It was reported in 1954 that 25 percent of farmable land in 
Algeria was owned by only 2 percent of the farming community; it was also documented 
that year that the Muslim community only owned 11.6 hectares of farmable land, while 
the European community owned 123.7 hectares of farmable land.30  
The Algerian independence movement began with the formation of the 
Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (CRUA) in the spring of 1954.31 On 10 
October 1954, the CRUA was renamed the National Libération Front (FLN).32 Then on 1 
November 1954—All Saints’ Day—at 12:01 a.m., the FLN officially began operations 
with simultaneous attacks throughout Algeria.33 The FLN liberated Algeria through a 
radical nationalist political agenda and a loose Islamic framework. The FLN consisted of 
two subgroups: a radical militant wing called the Army for National Liberation (ALN), 
who fought the French army with guerrilla tactics, and the Movement National Algerian 
(MNA). The MNA conducted a similar strategy to the FLN’s, but planned to compete 
against the FLN to win Muslim support in Algeria.34 The MNA eventually collapsed 
under the ferocity of the ALN’s guerrilla tactics. By August 1956, the FLN was dominant 
                                                 
29 Ibid., Chapter 3. 
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33 Ibid., Chapter 3. 
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in Algeria, aligning organizational support from “the Oulema [sic] (Islamic scholars), the 
liberals, as well as the communists.”35  
France would eventually counter the FLN with a strong military presence and the 
Morice Line in 1957. The Morice Line consisted of fences along the western and eastern 
borders of Algeria to prevent external assistance from reaching the FLN. In 1958, Charles 
de Gaulle became the minister of defense, and six months later the president of the 
French Republic. Both De Gaulle’s determination to keep the Algerian colony and his 
aggressive tactics ended up benefiting the FLN and shocking the Western world.36 From 
1959–1966, de Gaulle removed France from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), which protested its hold on Algeria, in hopes of preserving the French–Algerian 
colony.37  
During the French–Algerian War, Algeria’s southern border was the Saharan 
Desert, its northern border was the Alboran and Balearic Seas, and it bordered Morocco 
to the west and Tunisia to the east (Figure 2). Figure 2 also shows the six wilayas (see 
footnote 38) within Algeria, which were developed by the ALN for organizational 
purposes. Wilaya 1 covered the Aurès Mountains, Wilaya 2 the region of Constantine, 
Wilaya 3 Kabylia, Wilaya 4 the region of Algiers, Wilaya 5 the region of Oran, and 
Wilaya 6 the Sahara Desert; Wilaya 7 (not visible in Figure 2) was established within 
France to generate support and organization for the ALN.38 The ALN decentralized for 
politico-military commands, making each wilaya accountable for “indoctrinating, 
                                                 
35 Abdelkader Aoudjit, The Algerian Novel and Colonial Discourse: Witnessing to a Différend, eds. 
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mobilizing, and taxing the civil population, by persuasion or terror; and recruiting, 
training, arming, and commanding the ALN” within their region.39 
 
Figure 2.  Algeria during the French–Algerian War.40 
2. Safe Haven and Transit 
Safe havens are imperative for insurgencies to develop and succeed.41 Safe 
havens allow insurgencies to shuttle personnel, equipment, and funds through their 
territory and support propaganda, recruitment, and essential training and resting locations 
for fighters, which all strengthen insurgencies’ resilience. The FLN formed two different 
                                                 
39 Martin Windrow, “The Army of National Liberation,” in The Algerian War 1954–62 (Oxford, UK: 
Osprey Publishing, 2013), Kindle edition. 
40 Source: Windrow, “The Background,” The Algerian War. 
41 Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 84.  
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insurgency groups, an external group and an internal group within Algeria.42 The 
external group provided military supplies to the internal group through the weak borders 
of neighboring Morocco and Tunisia. The internal group executed guerrilla operations 
within the six wilayas of Algeria. On 22 October 1956, future Algerian premier Ahmed 
Ben Bella was apprehended and imprisoned by the French army while on a Moroccan 
airline.43 This event, along with Morocco’s and Tunisia’s own recent independence from 
France in March 1956, persuaded those countries to side with the FLN.44 Morocco and 
Tunisia supported the FLN with safe havens by providing training facilities for future 
FLN insurgency fighters, facilitating refugee recruitment, and tolerating the movement of 
approximately 1,000 fighters per month across their borders.45 
The FLN eventually made the external group more organized to aid in mass 
shipments to Algeria. In 1960, after a massive restructure and activity-level 
reorganization to confront the French army, the MLGC (Ministère de Liaisons Générales 
et de Communications) and MARG (Ministère de l’Armement et des Ravitaillements 
Généraux) merged. The MLGC and MARG had each supported logistics movement for 
reliable transportation into Algeria. Under the new merger, the Direction Logistique Est 
(DLE) was established, with two subdepartments: weapons and material, and general 
supplies. The DLE established personnel in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and 
Germany to support resupply to the eastern front of Algeria through Tunisia.46 
The FLN used vehicles, planes, and maritime platforms through safe havens to 
receive essential supplies during their fight for independence. Vehicle supplies into 
Algeria used specific routes to avoid detection. One westerly vehicle route that facilitated 
transit for the FLN traveled from Guinea to Mali and eventually to one of the three 
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provinces in Algeria: Bordj Badji Mokhtar, Tamanrasset, or Ain Salah. An easterly route 
the FLN used was from Egypt through Libya to Tunisia, ending in Algeria. Travelers on 
this route moved only at night, for approximately 2,600 km one way. Two drivers in a 
modified vehicle could travel from Egypt to the eastern front of Algeria without 
refueling. The route was divided into sections, with tow trucks and mechanics available 
to ensure no vehicles were abandoned and to allow quick handling of maintenance 
issues.47 A digitized document by Bouzid, identified the shipments of vehicle resupply 
along the eastern front of Algeria between 1957 and 1962 consisted of 
• 1957: Two return trips per month with six 10-ton trucks; itinerary Marsa 
Matrouh – Tarhouna. 
• 1958: Two return trips per month with six 10-ton trucks. 
• 1959: Six return trips per month with six Mercedes trucks of 10 tons and 
six Lancia trucks of 25 tons (Chinese delivery – 20,000 U.S. guns 7.62 
with SASCO trucks of 10 tons). 
• 1960: Two return trips per month with six Mercedes trucks of 10 tons. 
• 1961: Four return trips per month with six trucks. 
• 1962: Four return trips per month with twelve trucks48  
The FLN also incorporated planes and maritime vessels traveling through safe 
havens to replenish their insurgency operations. One aerial channel consisted of Tripoli, 
Libya, to Casablanca, Morocco, and eventually across the border into Algeria. This route 
involved smuggling shells and weapons on civilian aircraft owned by the British 
Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC). Vessel shipments were also made possible 
through the Atlantic Ocean, Alboran Sea, and Mediterranean Sea. Even though the 
French Navy kept constant vigilance over the ocean bordering Algeria, several shipments 
of weapons managed to reach the FLN.49 See Table 1. 
                                                 




Table 1.   Nationalities Supplying the FLN and Arrival Ports.50 
 
 
To combat the safe haven provided by Morocco and Tunisia, the French military 
proposed constructing a wall, which they named the Morice Line, to prevent the transit of 
financial resources and military equipment over the border.51 The Morice Line stretched 
across 750 kilometers on the Moroccan border and 460 kilometers on the Tunisian 
border. The borders consisted of multiple levels of reinforced security measures including 
minefields, eight-foot electric fences with electronic sensors, and roving personnel with 
dogs. The FLN was relentless in their attempts to penetrate the Morice Line. They 
attempted everything from digging under the fences to going around the fences though 
the Sahara Desert to employing Bangalore torpedoes to clear a passage.52 Virtually no 
attempts could get past the overwhelming presence and safety measures the French Army 
had implemented. Ultimately, the Morice Line was able to “[reduce] infiltration into 
Algeria by … 90 percent.”53 The completion of the Morice Line in September 1957 
forced the FLN to reassess their external support means and was the closest the French 
came to victory throughout the entire French–Algerian War. The Morice Line allowed 
temporary containment of FLN external support by the French army and forced the FLN 
to acquire insurgency support elsewhere. Eventually, the Morice Line was abandoned 
after French political support for the war declined. 
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51 Reider, External Support to Insurgencies, 3. 
52 Brush, The Story Behind the McNamara Line, 18–24. 
53 Ibid. 
 16 
3. Financial Resources 
The FLN implemented several financing methods to support their revolution 
against the French Army. The FLN generated financial support through mandated taxes, 
individual contributions, and support from other states, specifically Saudi Arabia and the 
PRC.54 To provide an idea of how much money was raised by the FLN during the 
French–Algerian War, estimates indicate that the FLN contributed 80 percent of the 
budget for the GPRA (Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic) to gain 
international recognition for itself.55 
Between 1957 and 1958, the FLN developed a revolutionary tax in Wilaya 7, 
which targeted all French–Algerians living in France.56 If individuals refused or were 
unable to pay the revolutionary tax, the FLN implemented extortion or beating methods 
to force them. The FLN also depended on voluntary donations from citizens to support 
their insurgency.57  
The FLN also received financial support from individuals driven by ideology or 
profit. Francis Jeanson, a Marxist, teacher, writer, and editor residing in France, was one 
such individual. In 1957, Jeanson established a secretive network to support the FLN, 
referred to as the “suitcase carriers.”58 The Jeanson network consisted of left-wing 
French militants striving to destroy colonialism. The network supported the insurgency 
by smuggling suitcases full of French francs from Algeria to Switzerland, with intentions 
to gain hefty Swiss interest rates for the FLN. Jeanson had no fewer than 40 individuals 
                                                 
54 A. Bouzid, “Summary of Armament during the 1954 Revolution,” 1–8; “Letter to the GPRA Prime 
Minister, ‘Mission Summary,’” trans. Asselin and Kostrzewski, History and Public Policy Program Digital 
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56 The Catholic Counter-Reformation in the 21st Century, “The Strong National Reaction on May 13, 
1958,” in The Algerian War, accessed 13 December 2015. http://crc-Internet.org/our-doctrine/national-
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57 Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 1–607. 
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running this network. They operated for three years before the French eventually 
discovered them.59 
Another source of financing for the FLN came from oil businessman Enrico 
Mattei.60 Mattei, an Italian national, developed a business strategy through the company 
Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI) that deterred most major oil companies from 
participating in oil trades. He generated relationships with Egypt in 1955, Iran in 1957, 
Morocco in 1958, Libya and Sudan in 1959, Tunisia in 1961, and Nigeria in 1962. 
Mattei’s strategy for going against colonial powers and NATO regulations allowed ENI 
to gain partnership with Algeria in the oil industry. Algeria was first noticed as an oil 
source in 1956, with the discovery of commercial oil in the Hassi Messaoud oil field; oil 
production followed in 1958.61 The discovery of oil in Algeria sparked Mattei’s interest 
to conduct unsavory business, allowing Mattei to implement his Mattei formula, which 
allowed host countries of utilized oil reserves to receive 75 percent of all profits,62 
making it extremely difficult for major oil companies to compete. Mattei’s business 
history was cut short when his plane mysteriously crashed in 1962.63 
Several countries also sent financial support to the FLN. In 1955, the Saudi 
Arabian royal family reportedly gave francs to support the Algerian revolution.64 The 
Chinese feared that directly supporting the FLN could damage their international market 
with other nations. Instead, they offered Algeria a 15 percent reduction in custom tariffs 
through the Sino-Algerian Accord in 1960.65 
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4. Political Support 
Political support was another external support element that gave the FLN 
international recognition. The political support the FLN gathered led to assistance 
through funding, supplies, and propaganda, ultimately resulting in Algeria gaining 
independence from France. The FLN managed to gain representation through 
conferences, state political support, speeches, and political organizations. Inhumane 
military actions by the French Army indirectly contributed to the FLN’s political support 
also, until eventually Algerian independence was placed on the agenda at the United 
Nations (UN). 
Between April and May of 1955, the FLN was given third-world recognition 
through the Bandung Conference, in Bandung, Indonesia (also referred as the Afro-Asian 
Conference).66 At the Bandung Conference, the FLN was recognized as the only 
acceptable representative for Algeria.67 The Bandung Conference attracted 29 nations to 
discuss peace and the development of third-world nations though economic growth and 
decolonization.68 Since Algeria was not recognized as an independent state, they could 
not officially attend the conference.69 Despite their not officially being able to 
participate, Algeria’s presence at the Bandung Conference was welcomed in hopes of 
moving closer to a goal of global decolonization. Algeria’s attendance at the Bandung 
Conference built their momentum for international acknowledgement as an independent 
state. 
The United States, along with other major world leaders, feared the outcome of 
the Bandung Conference. The U.S. identified the conference as having a left-wing 
socialist stance due to its ideological beliefs about the newly anticolonial independent 
states in Africa and Asia. Two interesting themes emerged from the conference. First, the 
Unites States was split between supporting the developing anticolonial nations and 
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Western European powers. Second, the conference echoed the themes of the U.S. Civil 
Rights era, which was just beginning.70 
The Afro-Asian Conference allowed Algeria to develop introductory contacts 
with the Soviet Union and the PRC. The FLN expanded their relationship with the Soviet 
Union and the PRC for political support, hoping both countries could apply direct and 
indirect political pressure on France. However, the Soviets realized that de Gaulle 
intended to disrupt the Atlantic Alliance and felt that disturbing this momentum would 
not be in the Kremlin’s best interest.71 As a result, they outwardly gave the FLN the cold 
shoulder and only supported the insurgents covertly, in small shipments. The PRC, on the 
other hand, were one of the first nations to recognize the GPRA.  
In the fall of 1958, French Army general de Gaulle asked the FLN to surrender by 
offering “the peace of the brave,” with no option other than relinquishing their 
weapons.72 Such an offer contributed to the FLN establishing the GPRA, a provisional 
government to gather Arab League and communist political support.73 The GPRA was 
formed in September 1958 and ended in 1962, when Algeria gained independence, and it 
was essential to Algeria, because it displayed proof of representation and an independent 
Algerian government. This allowed the FLN to gain political support for their insurgency 
against the French army.74 Table 2 displays 18 countries that recognized the GPRA in 
1959.  
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Table 2.   1959 GPRA Representation for the FLN.75 
 
 
Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser was one of the leading political 
supporters for Algeria’s independence.76 Nasser was the second president of Egypt and 
believed in aiding anticolonialism for free and independent nations. In November 1956, 
Nasser increased aid to the FLN, thereby supporting international recognition of 
Algeria.77 Nasser simultaneously lobbied the UN to pass resolutions supporting 
independence in Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria, along with aligning support from China 
and India.78 
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Syria also supported independence for Algeria, through political organizations 
and government leverage. Both the Ba’ath Party and the Muslim Brotherhood openly 
supported the FLN within Syria through demonstrations. The demonstrations were 
organized around anti-Western colonial values and demanded an economic, political, and 
cultural protest of France. The Syrian Parliament eventually aligned with the anti-French 
protests within Syria and moved to stop exporting wheat and cotton to Algeria and 
France, even though this would have devastating results for the Syrian economy. The 
Parliament’s actions resulted in Sa’id al-Ghazzi’s government resigning on 2 June 
1956.79 
Several world leaders openly spoke of their support for a free and independent 
Algeria, including Senator John F. Kennedy and Fidel Castro. In July 1957, Senator 
Kennedy spoke on the Senate floor, arguing to President Dwight D. Eisenhower and 
director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Allen Dulles that supporting Algerian 
independence from France was imperative.80 As American support began to favor the 
FLN, France started receiving increased U.S. political scrutiny, with Senator John F. 
Kennedy as one example.  
During the 1960s, Fidel Castro was a strong advocate for the spread of 
communism and anticolonialism. Castro realized that supporting uprising through 
insurgency movements was one of the most effective methods to achieve these outcomes. 
In 1962, Castro made several speeches expressing his support for an independent 
Algerian government. During the Cuban Revolution anniversary in Havana, Castro and 
Che Guevara met with the GPRA minister of foreign affairs, and Castro reiterated Cuba’s 
pledged support for the Algerian revolution:  
Algeria has made enormous sacrifices and the sooner the war ends, the 
better. It is in this phase of the struggle that Algeria needs the most 
support from the international community. I pledge to convince all the 
friendly countries to recognize the GPRA. With respect to negotiations 
between the latter and France, what is most important to take from France 
is power. You cannot let the levers of political control in the hands of the 
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French. Specifically, the maintaining of public order (public security) 
must be in your own hands. Make the largest concessions possible with 
respect to economic matters (oil in particular), guarantees to the European 
minority, and military bases. Once peace has been restored and you are 
firmly in control, then you will be able to do anything you want. Because 
international conditions are such that once France has exited politically, it 
will never be able to come back.81  
In October 1962, newly declared Algerian premier Ahmed Ben Bella visited Havana to 
meet with Castro and celebrate the newly independent Algerian nation. Which also 
overlapped with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Castro stressed to Bella that a “free, 
independent, and sovereign Algeria will be the seed, the mirror, and the spur for the 
peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America who have not yet achieved their national and 
social liberation.”82 
All the political support the Algerian nation received contributed to and 
maintained Algerian independence, which eventually led to UN membership on 8 
October 1962,83 six years after Tunisia and Morocco had also been accepted.  
The French Army’s use of violence also indirectly contributed to the Algerian 
narrative and increased the FLN’s international political support. The overzealous 
approach of the French resulted in accidental bombings of innocent civilians at schools 
and hospitals in Tunisia.84 On 8 February 1958, 35 French planes bombed villages in 
Tunisia, hoping to terminate the FLN’s influx of external support.85 However, the 
bombing resulted in the deaths of eighty noncombatants.86 For these actions, the French 
Army was restricted by the French government from operating in Morocco or Tunisia. 
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The French also used inhumane interrogation tactics to gather human intelligence 
(HUMINT).87 The French Army’s use of violence became a UN discussion topic and 
further amplified the FLN’s political message for independence throughout the 
international community.88 Political pressure on France was imperative for the FLN as 
they attempted to justify their grievances globally.  
5. Propaganda 
The FLN’s propaganda movement was executed both on a locally micro and 
internationally macro level, each designed to generate political acceptance and external 
support for the Algerian narrative. This, it was hoped, would damage the international 
view of the legitimacy of France’s use of armed forces against the Algerian population. 
Immediately after the FLN’s initial attacks on 1 November 1954, they released a message 
aiming for Algerian acceptance, stating the revolt was “a national struggle to destroy an 
archaic colonial regime … not a religious war.”89 The 1 November attacks instantly 
moved the Algerian desire for independence into international news.  
The CRUA’s internal propaganda movement originated in the spring of 1954 and 
worked to maintain nationalist traditions within Algeria. The CRUA propaganda 
narrative greatly supported insurgency recruitment by aligning local support within 
Algeria between the Arab and Kabyle populations. Aligned local support began to take 
form on 5 July 1954, in a meeting with revolutionary operatives within Algeria who 
referred to themselves as the Committee of the 22 and represented CRUA members. The 
meeting called for “the armed revolt under preparation … [as not being a] single blow 
aimed at drawing concessions from France, but an ‘unlimited revolution’ [instead].’”90 
When the FLN was formed, they further elaborated on this message, but took a violent 
approach beginning in November 1954. Saadi Yacef, the military leader for the FLN in 
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Wilaya 4 (Algiers), began radicalizing the inmates in local prisons for propaganda and 
recruitment purposes.91  
The French Army’s excessive use of violence only serves to reinforce the FLN’s 
propaganda message. From 1956 to 1957, the FLN intensified their guerrilla warfare 
tactics against military and civilian targets. This escalation resulted in the French Army’s 
use of inhumane interrogation techniques and excessive violence on Algerian civilians. 
The French Army, along with the local police and colonial volunteers, conducted 
“arrests, mass round-ups, systematic torture, summary executions, bombings using 
airplanes, and burning of whole villages and forests.”92 In August 1955, the French Army 
and police killed 12,000 innocent Algerian civilians and detained thousands more as a 
show of force and in response to a recent FLN attack.93  
Reaching an external audience was equally important for the FLN to generate 
international attention. The FLN conducted external propaganda with the help of 
supportive states that sought to end imperialism, colonialism, or neocolonialism, or that 
sought something specific to gain. Egypt, the United States, and the PRC all contributed 
to the FLN’s propaganda. Egypt’s President Nasser was a strong supporter of the FLN 
and “asked all Muslims in Algeria to join the national struggle [against France].”94 
Nasser also allowed the FLN to establish a broadcasting station in Egypt to deliver 
messages over Cairo radio and in local Arab prayer services.95 This helped generate 
Egyptian Muslim support for the FLN in the form of insurgency fighters, supplies, and 
eventually political support.  
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The FLN also contacted anyone outside the region who would listen to their 
justification for independence. In 1958, M’hamed Yazid sent a letter to the New York Times 
about the fraudulent election system established in Algeria by the French. Yazid stated that 
in the 1948 election, “more than 30 of us were arrested during the electoral campaign and 
put into jail for years.”96 This was published not long after Senator Kennedy reiterated his 
belief in an independent Algerian nation on the Senate floor in July 1957.  
The PRC agreed to help develop the FLN’s propaganda-delivering methods and 
techniques. In Cairo on 1 September 1960, the GPRA Prime Minister Ferhat Abbas met 
with the PRC and Soviet Union ambassadors. In the meeting, the PRC ambassador told 
Abbas that China would allow “three [Algerians who specialized in] communication 
service [to depart for Beijing, where they would receive] training in radio 
broadcasting.”97 This allowed the FLN to improve their propaganda-delivery techniques, 
which had been limited to radio, printed handbills, and random acts of violence as scare 
tactics to influence intrastate and interstate public opinion. 
6. Direct [to Indirect] Military Support 
The FLN received indirect military support through arms from the U.S., Great 
Britain along with arms transportation from Egypt and direct military support from Iraq, 
Turkey, China, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia.98 Indirect support is 
considered unintentional and or unknowing, and direct support is considered support that 
is intentionally contributed. The FLN also received material other than arms from East 
Germany and Albania. When the French–Algerian War became a talking point in the UN, 
the U.S. and Great Britain were quick to support ending the revolution, fearing France 
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was misusing NATO equipment in the war.99 In November 1957, the U.S. and Great 
Britain decided to send arms to Tunisia, knowing they would eventually reach FLN 
insurgents.100  
Egypt acted as a courier who transported arms from other countries to the FLN 
during the French–Algerian War. In 1956, the Egyptian government sent several 
shipments to the FLN, only one of which was intercepted. On 16 October 1956, the 
French Navy boarded the ship Athos, even though it was flying a Sudanese flag.101 The 
Athos was carrying over 70 tons of arms and ammunition for the FLN; the cargo had been 
loaded in Alexandria, Egypt, and purchased with Egyptian money. Author Alistair Horne, 
in A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962, confirmed the Athos arms manifest 
consisted of  
• 70 mortars 
• 40 machine-guns 
• 74 automatic rifles 
• 240 sub-machine-guns 
• 2,300 rifles 
• 2,000 mortar shells 
• 600,000 cartridges102 
This shipment would have been extremely significant to the FLN had it been received. At 
that point, the FLN had a maximum of 20 mortars and 10 machine guns in Algeria.103 
Bouzid validated that the Egyptian government sent another shipment of weapons 
to the FLN on 20 November 1956. This shipment originated from Egypt, bound for 
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Tunisia, with a final destination of Algeria.104 This shipment was distributed between the 
wilayas with the following deliveries: 
• Wilaya I: 400 [quantity of] 303 guns and FM Bren machine guns with 
ammunition. 
• Wilaya II: 400 guns and FM Bren machine guns with ammunition. 
• Wilaya III: 450 guns and FM Bren machine guns with ammunition. 
• Wilaya IV: 550 guns and FM Bren machine guns with ammunition. 
• Eastern base 100 guns and FM Bren machine guns with ammunition105 
Ten days prior to the 20 November 1956 shipment to the FLN, brothers Mahsas 
and Laskri also sent a quantity of 30 303 guns to Wilaya 2.106 Algerian nationals Mahsas 
and Laskri were in favor of the FLN’s movement for a liberated Algerian nation. 
Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser also contributed to the Algerian revolution with 
military protective equipment. From 1957 to 1958, Nasser provided British Mk. III steel 
helmets to the FLN.107 
In 1957, both Iraq and Turkey gave armaments to the FLN. Iraq sent a shipment 
“loaded with mortars of 50, 60, 80, and 81 millimeters, artillery shells, FM [Fusil-
mitrailleur Modèle] and submachine guns.”108 Turkey also contributed to the FLN that 
year by giving 5,000 PA (pistol automatic) and munitions for MGs (machine guns) 34 
and 42.109 Both these shipments provided the FLN with much-needed machine guns, 
which were sparse in Algeria.  
The Chinese offered the FLN more arms than all the Arab nations combined; they 
also supplied military assistance with material other than arms. In December 1958, the 
FLN sent their first teams to visit China, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, and North 
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Korea to establish international relations. At these talks, the Chinese promised the 
delivery of two million francs ($2,050,000) in arms to the FLN.110 Following the meeting 
in Peking, the PRC delivered as promised to the FLN in July 1959, shipping 13,000 tons’ 
worth of weapons to the ports in Alexandria, Egypt.111 This shipment consisted of 20,000 
7.62mm U.S. guns and was eventually transported to the FLN in Algeria by vehicle. 
A manifesto from the General Secretary of the GPRA identified that China also 
sent substantial military supplies to the FLN in 1960. While in Cairo in September 1960, 
the GPRA prime minister met with Chinese and Soviet ambassadors over arms 
shipments. During that meeting, the Chinese ambassador promised the shipment of 5,000 
binoculars of varying focus grades.112 In November 1960, the Chinese shipped a large 
armament to the FLN that consisted of  
• Magazine for machine guns: U.S.-type [illegible] (9 caliber): 20,000 
• Magazine for U.S.-type rifle: 15,000 
• Magazine for machine guns 11.4: 15,000 
• Shovels: 2,000 
• Pickaxes: 2,000113 
All the Chinese shipments helped the FLN maintain an aggressive stance against the 
French Army.  
Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia also contributed to FLN’s 
military surplus. In March 1961, Czechoslovakia gave a considerable shipment of 
weapons and equipment to the FLN.114 As they noticed the FLN slowly gaining 
international recognition, the Soviets gradually increased their support for the FLN in 
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Algeria, shipping large quantities of SKS rifles to Tunis, Tunisia.115 Yugoslavia was 
known for supporting post–World War II anticolonial revolutions throughout Asia and 
Africa,116 and in 1962, they sent the FLN Soviet bloc artillery and armor.117  
Two other European countries supporting the FLN with non-weapon assistance 
were East Germany and Albania. East Germany established Red Cross representatives in 
Morocco as a covert, unofficial means of assisting Algeria, then used this Red Cross 
connection to ship over material assistance.118 Albania also provided equipment other 
than arms to the FLN, which included military and civilian clothes and food, and 
educated select Algerians in Albania.119 Receiving food and military clothes was 
important for the FLN, as it allowed them to concentrate their resources elsewhere.  
7. Conclusion  
Reviewing the French–Algerian war shows how significant external support can 
be, even against a far superior force: the French Army. Record explained in Beating 
Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win that “most states that lose to insurgencies appear to suffer 
from some combination of inferior political will, inferior war strategy, and an inability to 
isolate insurgent forces from external support.”120 The FLN was able to make use of safe 
havens and transit through bordering countries to shuttle supplies, personnel, and military 
support to their organization. They leveraged financial resources, political assistance, and 
propaganda throughout their asymmetric conflict, and the French Army’s excessive use 
of violence escalated international recognition for the GPRA. Gil Merom stated this 
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escalation was due to the French government giving the French Army excessive 
autonomy in Algeria, which led to inhumane military actions.121 Merom explained that 
the French Army’s aggressive actions in Algeria raised moral criticism, which shifted the 
“war’s center of gravity and public’s interest.”122  
The FLN was able to sustain the French–Algerian War because of direct and 
indirect military support from state actors, even though France had a superior force. The 
various motivations of anticolonialism, spreading communism, anti-Western views, 
supporting Muslims, and propping up an independent Algerian nation contributed to state 
military support for the FLN. France dominated the FLN militarily, but collapsed in the 
political and diplomatic area. The FLN lacked a standing army with military resources 
and competing technological capabilities against the French, but they organized internally 
and externally to generate the outside resources they needed. In the end, between the fall 
of the fourth French Republic, the UN General Assembly decision, and NATO pressure, 
the French supported Algerian independence on 3 July 1962.123 
B. VIETNAM WAR 
The Vietnam War case study will also help to identify trends in external insurgency 
support. This case study will first provide a brief background of the Vietnam War, also 
called the Second Indochina War, and then evaluate the five external support elements—
safe haven and transit, financial resources, political support, propaganda, and direct 
military support—for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) throughout the Vietnam 
War.124 This thesis will use the term intrastate to refer to the North and South Vietnam 
region, and interstate will include the remaining countries that participated in the war. 
                                                 
121 Gil Merom, “The Social Origins of the French Capitulation in Algeria.” Armed Forces & Society 
30, no. 4 (Summer 2004), 619. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 1–624. 
124 Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, v–vi. 
 31 
1. Vietnam War Background 
The U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, to varying degrees, lasted from 1955–
1975. However, Vietnam had been at war with France, during the First Indochina War 
from 1946–1954. A variety of events after World War II had led to the political divide of 
Vietnam and the Second Indochina War. On 2 September 1945, the Potsdam Conference, 
which was held in and named after the northern German city Potsdam, prepared for the 
end of World War II.125 During the conference, world leaders decided to divide Vietnam 
at the 16th parallel in hopes of reducing the strength of Japan. This strategy relied on 
China accepting the surrender of Japanese force in northern Vietnam and the British 
accepting the same in southern Vietnam. During the Potsdam Conference, the French 
asked to reclaim their colonies in Southeast Asia (Indochina). The French request was 
granted, turning Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia back into French colonies. This return to 
colonialism resulted in the Ho Chi Minh rebellion, which established a provisional 
government, the DRV, in northern Vietnam. On 2 September 1945, the DRV declared 
Vietnamese independence.126  
Then, on 19 December 1945, 30,000 Vietnamese attacked the French in the city 
of Hanoi, Vietnam, which began the First Indochina War. In January 1950, the PRC 
under Mao Zedong and the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin acknowledged DRV rule 
through Ho Chi Minh. Once the PRC and Soviets had recognized the DRV, channels of 
external support quickly opened for Ho Chi Minh against anticommunist nations. On 21 
July 1954, the Geneva Accords proposed to divide Vietnam at the 17th parallel—the same 
year the French withdrew from Vietnam, after losing approximately 75,000 troops.127 
The heavy French losses were partly due to the DRV receiving substantial external 
support to sustain insurgency operations.  
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The Geneva Accords relied on a divisional solution at the end of the Korean War 
in 1953, which divided Korea at the 38th parallel.128 The Geneva Accords’ proposed a 
division of Vietnam that would allow Ho Chi Minh to control the communist northern 
Vietnam, and Bao Dai, the emperor of Vietnam until August 1954, was to control 
southern Vietnam.129 The United States wanted this division to be temporary, fearing the 
development of a long-term communist nation. However, in January 1957, the Soviet 
Union suggested making it permanent and allowing both North Vietnam and South 
Vietnam to join the United Nations. The United States opposed the Soviets’ request, 
fearing a communist expansion. In March 1959, Ho Chi Minh announced a people’s war 
against the Republic of Vietnam, which cascaded events into the Second Indochina War. 
In December 1960, the National Liberation Front (NLF) arose in Hanoi to represent the 
communist guerrilla fighters in South Vietnam.130 The NLF supported the development 
of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), which used guerrilla tactics against the 
anticommunists’ conventional tactics.  
There were many players in the Vietnam War, several of which have more than 
one name. The North Vietnamese government, also referred to as the DRV, was the 
government under Ho Chi Minh acting to spread communism against the United States. 
Western regional experts implemented the term Viet Cong for the NLF. The NLF 
established the People’s Liberation Armed Forces of South Vietnam (PLAF),131 with 
both guerilla and conventional tactics. Due to their being located in South Vietnam, some 
of the PLAF were recruited to join the People’s Army of North Vietnam, also called the 
NVA. For the remainder of this paper, I will use the term DRV for the North Vietnamese 
government and the NVA as the pro-communist army fighting the United States and 
South Vietnam. As the United States and South Vietnam (officially the Republic of 
Vietnam) were fighting the spread of communism in Asia, the DRV was receiving 
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substantial external support to sustain a robust insurgency. The Vietnam War quickly 
escalated into violent guerrilla attacks orchestrated by the NVA, while the United States 
was primarily depending on conventional warfare tactics.  
Figure 3 shows a map of the Vietnam region during the Vietnam War and the 
1954 Geneva Accords 17th parallel line (Demilitarized Zone or DMZ) dividing Vietnam. 
It shows how Vietnam was bordered to the south and east by the South China Sea. It also 
displays the northern border of Vietnam, shared with China, and the western border of 
Vietnam, shared with Laos and Cambodia.  
 
Figure 3.  Indochina (1953–1954).132 
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2. Safe Haven and Transit 
At the interstate level, the NVA used safe haven and transit to move people and 
resources freely in and out of Vietnam with little interference. The NVA took advantage 
of weak borders to receive shipments through the South China Sea to transport along the 
border with the PRC and eventually along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which connected 
northern Vietnam to southern Vietnam while running inside the Laos and Cambodian 
borders. The Ho Chi Minh supply lines would later prove a serious problem for the U.S. 
military during the Vietnam War. 
In July 1954, the Geneva Agreements, also known as the Geneva Accords, signed 
in Switzerland, were designed to end the First Indochina War.133 They resulted in the 
partitioning of French Indochina into Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, which was further 
divided at the 17th parallel into North and South Vietnam. However, the partitioning of 
the two Vietnams, theoretically, was to last only until a free election could be held. 
Figure 4 shows French Indochina before the Geneva Agreements. Following the 
agreements, the NVA was viewed as a proxy force for the Chinese,134 resulting in the 
U.S. entering the Vietnam War one year after the partition. 
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Figure 4.  Laos as an Integral Neutral Buffer before the Geneva Accords.135 
The Geneva Agreements would eventually present opportunities for Laos to be 
extremely beneficial to the NVA by providing safe havens, and in turn, these 
opportunities would make Laos a crucial element in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam 
War. In January 1961, President Eisenhower gave advice to Kennedy the day before his 
presidential inauguration, stating “[Laos is] the strategic key to the entire area of 
Southeast Asia.”136 In 1962, another Geneva meeting was held, this time addressing 
Laos’s neutrality. The 1962 signing of the International Agreement on the Neutrality of 
Laos resulted in the U.S. slowly accepting communist intervention into neutral Laos 
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through the Ho Chi Minh Trail.137 Roger Hilsman, assistant secretary of state for Far 
Eastern affairs from May 1963 to March 1964, described several elements of the 1962 
Geneva talks, including the assertion the NVA had failed to withdraw from Laos and 
abide by the 1954 Geneva Agreements, while the U.S. had upheld the agreements’ strict 
guidelines.138 The 1962 Geneva talks resulted in a formal agreement of Laos’s neutrality, 
simultaneously contributing to a “tacit agreement” about how the world powers would 
use Laos for regional influence: the U.S. would control the capital region of Laos, and the 
communists would control eastern and southern Laos.  
The 1962 political agreement created a hypothetically neutral Laos, but in reality 
the NVA could use the country for safe haven and transit so long as the truly neutral 
northwestern section of Laos was untouched. The NVA slowly expanded into Laos along 
the Ho Chi Minh Trail, through mutual support with the Pathet Lao, the communist party 
in Laos.139 The NVA managed to distract the U.S. and make them think that U.S. 
political intervention in northwestern Laos was making considerable difference, while the 
NVA made use of the eastern half of Laos. The U.S. was also confronted with the 
dilemma of either invading Laos, most likely escalating a communist intervention, or 
doing nothing and hoping the NVA would not exploit the safe havens and transit 
opportunities Laos presented into South Vietnam.140  
In December 1970, Congress passed the Cooper-Church amendment, which 
“prohibited any U.S. forces from operating on the ground inside Cambodia or Laos.”141 
This would severely restrict U.S. forces’ efforts to block safe haven and transit 
opportunities the NVA were using in Laos and Cambodia. The United States’ decision to 
stay out of Laos made them unable to disrupt NVA travel through Laos and Cambodia to 
South Vietnam, which contributed to an influx in NVA personnel into South Vietnam.  
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Figure 5 shows the region following the 1962 tacit agreement. The southeastern 
section of Laos (dotted area) is where the Ho Chi Minh Trail was operating under NVA 
and Pathet Lao control,142 allowing the NVA direct access to Cambodia, which was 
striking distance from Saigon. The northwestern section (lined area) of Laos in Figure 5 
was considered the neutral Laos area, with U.S. support. It was implied in the tacit 
agreement that if the U.S. did not interrupt NVA access through Laos to South Vietnam, 
the NVA would not overrun northwestern neutral bases in Laos.143 
 
Figure 5.  Laos Partitioned in the Framework of the Tacit Agreement.144 
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The NVA received transit support from the Soviets through the South China Sea. 
Data from the former USSR Foreign Ministry stated the DRV received annual shipments 
worth $450 million from the Soviets, $180 million from the PRC, and $190 million from 
other communist countries.145 The Soviets mostly carried military supplies and personnel 
through the South China Sea to the NVA while avoiding patrolling U.S. warships. Select 
NVA personnel were brought to the Soviet Union to learn the military details of running 
a modern army, along with specific combat skills.146 In July 1972, the Frunze Military 
Academy in Moscow, as quoted by Sarin and Dvoretsky, stated, “Almost 20 percent of 
the commanders of the Vietnamese Army have studied in our academy.”147 It was 
reported that between 1965 and 1974, more than 10,000 NVA personnel attended Soviet 
military academies.148 The training the NVA received in Moscow was only possible due 
to safe haven and transit around Vietnam.  
The PRC’s relaxed southern border with Vietnam greatly contributed to the 
longevity of the NVA through strategic staging areas, free movement of supplies, and 
infrastructure support. The Chinese built airfields along their border with Vietnam, 
offering NVA pilots a safe haven for repairs, maintenance, and refueling.149 The Chinese 
also allowed the NVA access to railroads for moving supplies within the PRC from the 
South China Sea to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, travel that was only possible because the U.S. 
feared future conflict with the PRC or the Soviet Union. The PRC facilitated a movement 
amongst Chinese workers to help repair DRV infrastructure damaged during the war. 
This allowed the NVA to fight instead of spending time and resources building railroad 
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tracks, bridges, tunnels, bunkers, or fortifications.150 The safe haven and transit provided 
by the Chinese virtually turned the Ho Chi Minh Trail into a highway (Figure 6). 
Established centuries before the Vietnam War, the Ho Chi Minh Trail was 
originally foot trails used for trade, but it was transformed as the war progressed and the 
DMZ was established along the 17th parallel.151 The DMZ ran from the border of Laos to 
the South China Sea and was approximately 5 km wide, making it very difficult to cross. 
By 1965, U.S. involvement had ramped up the DMZ, making it almost impenetrable, 
which forced the NVA to rely on the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos, Cambodia, and 
South Vietnam.152 
The extensive use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail could not have been possible without 
the work of the NVA 559th Command Group, which was named for the date of their 
formation, May 1959. The 559th Command Group began to develop the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail, strategically placing air defenses, communication, medical support bunkers, tunnels 
for soldiers to sleep in, and security posts along it. The Ho Chi Minh Trail proved 
invaluable over the years for the NVA by allowing transit of much-need military supplies 
and personnel to fight the Vietnam government. Lanning and Cragg estimated that traffic 
of NVA soldiers along the Ho Chi Minh Trail went from 6,000 in 1964 to over 100,000 
in 1969.153 By 1973, the trail included 20,000 kilometers of communication cable, a 
1,000-kilometer-long by 8-meter-wide all-weather road that supported 10,000 vehicles a 
day, and a pipeline 5,000 kilometers in length.154 This allowed the NVA to receive 100 
tons of supplies per day, transferred through three locations: 15 tons per day through the 
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DMZ, 50 tons per day through Laos, and 35 tons of food per day through Cambodia.155 
The Ho Chi Minh Trail was a success for the NVA, as the United States and South 
Vietnam did little to stem the continuous flow of support.  
 
Figure 6.  Ho Chi Minh Trail.156 
In 1965, the United States began considering a barrier wall and blocking 
strategies to counter the supplies reaching South Vietnam from North Vietnam. A barrier 
concept was proposed to General Goodpaster, who discussed it with then–U.S. secretary 
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of state Robert McNamara.157 The idea was sent to the Institution of Defense Analysis. 
Its JASON Division (JASON: July, August, September, October, November) proposed a 
plan that would include choke points utilizing advanced sensor technology with 
electronic fence, mines, and air and ground observation, just south of the DMZ.158 The 
U.S. government poured $1.5 billion into the McNamara Line for construction and 
estimated an additional $740 million for annual operations.159 Many senior military 
officials believed that the McNamara Line would prove inadequate to keep the NVA out 
of the south. The barrier concept was eventually abandoned once troops maintaining the 
McNamara Line began taking regular shelling by the NVA.160 The excessive costs of 
maintaining the McNamara Line, combined with the alternative route to South Vietnam 
through the Ho Chi Minh Trail, also contributed to the decision to vacate the McNamara 
Line.  
In January 1966, the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Thailand 
(MACTHAI) first proposed an isolating strategy. MACTHAI proposed using 
anticommunist troops to put pressure on southern Laos from the west and east to 
gradually cut off the Ho Chi Minh Trail.161 General Westmoreland, who believed that 
eliminating the support along the eastern side of the Ho Chi Minh Trail would thoroughly 
turn the tables in the war, followed up with a similar suggestion for interrupting the 
supply channels along the trail. He was unable to execute his blocking strategy, though, 
due to opposing U.S. policies and the 1968 Tet Offensive.162 In 1976, a year after the 
Vietnam War ended, General Westmoreland stated in his memoir, “I still [hope] some 
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day to get approval for a major drive into Laos to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail.”163 The 
NVA benefited from political confusion about Laos’ neutrality and inadequate U.S. 
military strategies, which together made it possible for countless supplies and personnel 
to move into South Vietnam.  
3. Financial Resources 
The DRV received funds from the Soviets and the PRC, both of whom supported 
the DRV in hopes of a communist victory. The Soviet military and economic aid to the 
DRV totaled $365 million between 1954 and 1964. Aid in the following years modestly 
increased. Soviet aid was $295 million in just 1965. In 1966, the Soviet contributions to 
the NVA were $510 million, and they rose to more than $705 million in 1967. For the 
remaining years of the Vietnam War, the DRV received an average of $420 million per 
year from the Soviets.164 
The PRC also gave financial support to the DRV during the Vietnam War. In the 
decade before 1965, the PRC gave more than $670 million to the DRV. In 1965, the 
PRC’s contributions increased from $110 million to $225 million between 1965 and 
1967.165 This robust financial support from the Soviets and the PRC allowed the DRV to 
wage a prolonged campaign against the U.S. and South Vietnam.  
4. Political Support 
Political support allowed the DRV to justify their cause on a global scale. Political 
support for the DRV came from the Soviet Union, the PRC, and Cuba. Joseph Stalin, 
whose concern was spreading communism in Asia and who gave little regard to the 
people of Vietnam, established a diplomatic relationship with the DRV on 30 January 
1950, opening the door for future Soviet support.166 On 17 November 1964, Soviet 
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premier Alexei Kosygin had a message delivered to the National Liberation Front South 
Vietnam (NLFSVN) affirming the Soviets’ support.167 Strengthened political relations 
allowed the NLF to occupy an office in Moscow.168 On the 6 February 1965, Kosygin 
visited Hanoi, Vietnam in hopes of strengthening the bond with the NLF.169 During 
Kosygin’s visit to Hanoi, he demanded the U.S. withdraw from South Vietnam and 
promised the Soviets would provide material to Ho Chi Minh’s struggle.170 Kosygin’s 
visit to Hanoi paved the way for the Soviets to spread communism in Asia and gain 
global allies during the Cold War era.  
Between 1964 and 1965, Mao Zedong feared U.S. involvement in Vietnam would 
lead to a complete encirclement of China, jeopardizing their national security.171 Mao 
believed in strengthening the political relationship with the DRV, hoping for a 
communist victory against a major Western power. Chen Jian, author of China’s 
Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964–69, believes Mao wanted to support the DRV’s 
conflict in order to promote the PRC’s “continuous revolution.”172 In addition to their 
political support, the PRC eventually gave the DRV financial aid, personal assistance, 
supplies, and safe haven and transit throughout the Vietnam War. 
Cuban prime minister Fidel Castro believed in generating as many allies as 
possible against major Western powers like the United States. Castro learned that 
supporting small revolutions through proxy conflicts could be the quickest and easiest 
way to gain political support. He publically stated Cuba’s support for the DRV on 30 
August 1971, at Havana University, stating: 
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We hold that in Vietnam the fighting spirit and heroism of the nations 
have been manifested to the highest level. When faced with the necessity 
to cope with the U.S. imperialists who have used all the most up-to-date 
means and every weapon of destruction to attack them, the Vietnamese 
people have not hesitated to cope the U.S. imperialist and in reality they 
are defeating them.173 
Castro reiterated Cuba’s political support for the DRV in a July 1973 delegation speech 
in Hanoi, and in September 1973, he addressed the central committee of the Vietnam 
Workers Party. In March 1974, Castro sent a message supporting the Vietnamese 
Women’s Congress, and the same month, Cuba held a Vietnam solidarity really in 
Havana.174 Castro’s political support for the DRV was similar to political support Cuba 
had offered to the FLN in Algeria.  
5. Propaganda 
Andrew Mack stated in Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of 
Asymmetric Conflicts that ‘“If the external power’s ‘will’ to continue the struggle is 
destroyed, then its military capability—no matter how powerful—is totally 
irrelevant.”’175 The DRV realized the importance of propaganda during the Vietnam War 
and attempted it internally throughout Vietnam and toward a wider international 
audience. The U.S. military’s excessive force and repercussion press coverage 
inadvertently contributed to the DRV’s propaganda messages throughout the war. The 
North Vietnamese also benefited indirectly from changes in the U.S. media coverage of 
the conflict. The U.S. failed to spot the importance of propaganda, given their 
overconfidence in the asymmetric war with Vietnam and their previous victory in World 
War II.  
Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David 
Brannan in the book titled Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements state how 
insurgencies can use propaganda to legitimize their goals, support funding and recruiting, 
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discredit opposing governments, and internationalize their conflicts, all through either an 
intrastate or interstate approach.176 Several new schools of thought arose from the DRV’s 
usage of propaganda during the Vietnam War. The DRV conducted on-camera interviews 
through the U.S. press, which contributed to their global message.177 They also used non-
recorded face-to-face interviews, printed handbills, posters, pamphlets, and radio 
broadcasts to generate support from local Vietnamese in remote locations and from U.S. 
civil workers in Vietnam to hopefully resonate back to the U.S.178 These actions 
eventually contributed to mass antiwar protests throughout the U.S., which also affected 
political views of the war. Ultimately, the DRV’s propaganda resulted in a legitimacy for 
them and an international arms conflict against anticommunist governments.  
The United States media indirectly contributed to the interests of the DRV 
through coverage of the Tet Offensive, alleged GI war crimes, and American POWs in 
Vietnam. During this period, the spread of home television allowed the media to gain 
more influence over the American population, since TV owners went from 10,000 to 46 
million between 1945 and 1960.179 A 1964 survey by the Roper Organization for the 
Television Information Office reported that 58 percent of American respondents received 
their news from TV.180 In April 1961, President John F. Kenney realized the influence 
the media had over the American population and addressed the issue by stating: 
If the press is awaiting a declaration of war before it imposes the self-
discipline of combat conditions, then I can only say that no war ever posed 
a greater threat to our security. If you are awaiting a finding of “clear and 
present danger,” then I can only say that the danger has never been more 
clear and its presence more imminent. ... Every newspaper now asks itself 
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with respect to every story: “Is it news?” All I suggest is that you add the 
question: “Is it in the interest of national security?”181 
For the first time, media was embedded with GIs in combat, giving Americans a 
new understanding of the Vietnam War. Walter Cronkite, a CBS Evening News reporter, 
was notorious for giving the weekly American body count in Vietnam.182 On 9 October 
1967, Walter Cronkite released a graphic video in which a GI soldier cut off a Vietcong 
soldier’s ear for a souvenir, filmed two days prior.183 It was later confirmed that the 
Cronkite media team had given the knife to the GI and dared him to cut off the ear of a 
dead Vietcong.184 The media’s involvement gave Americans a never-before-seen view of 
war that made them question the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.  
The 1968 Tet Offensive (Figure 7) was the beginning of U.S. withdrawal from the 
Vietnam War.185 Tet marks the Vietnamese New Year, a time when families reunite and 
exchange gifts. Weeks before the Tet Offensive, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong 
offered a seven-day truce with the South Vietnamese Army to mark the holiday.186 The 
South Vietnamese and allied forces acknowledged they would implement a 36-hour 
truce,187 but in January 1968, the NVA executed multiple aggressive attacks against 
South Vietnam, ignoring the agreement.188 In the Tet Offensive, “34 provincial capitals, 
64 district capitals, and all autonomous cities were attacked.”189 The Tet Offensive was 
unable to destroy the South Vietnamese Army or sociopolitical system. However, it did 
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have a drastic impact on the American population, who were accustomed to winning wars 
and now were receiving daily graphic media images of GI casualties.190  
Following the Tet Offensive, journalist reports on GI victories in Vietnam 
decreased from 62 percent to 44 percent.191 In February 1968, shortly after the Tet 
Offensive commenced, Walter Cronkite addressed the American population on CBS 
Evening News, stating: 
To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in the face of the 
evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To suggest we 
are on the edge of defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism. To say 
that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, 
conclusion. On the off chance that military and political analysts are right, 
in the next few months we must test the enemy’s intentions, in case this is 
indeed his last big gasp before negotiations. But it is increasingly clear to 
this reporter that the only rational way out then will be to negotiate, not as 
victors, but as an honorable people who lived up to their pledge to defend 
democracy, and did the best they could.192  
The Tet Offensive was perceived as a U.S. military defeat even though it was the NVA 
who were defeated; the U.S. military strategy switched from pursuit to withdrawal with 
Vietnamization, which infuriated many U.S. Army generals.193 In General 
Westmoreland’s memoir, he stated that American reporters had contributed to the NVA’s 
psychological victory from the Tet Offensive.194  
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Figure 7.  Southern Vietnam, January 1968: Tet Offensive Major Battles.195 
America’s actions during the Vietnam War created a negative image of 
anticommunists and supported the DRV propaganda narrative. A report assembled by the 
Pentagon in the 1970s contained 9,000 pages of alleged U.S. war crimes in Vietnam and 
is supported by investigative files, witness statements, and situation reports from senior 
military officers.196 America in Vietnam estimated that from 1965–74, 30–40 percent of 
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the Vietnam War deaths were civilians.197 As quoted in The War Behind Me: Vietnam 
Veterans Confronting the Truth About U.S. War Crimes, Vietnam War veteran John 
Kerry testified to Congress on 22 April 1971 and described the actions of other American 
soldiers in Vietnam:  
[They] raped, cut off ears, cut off heads, taped wires from portable 
telephones to human genitals and turned up the power, cut off limbs, blew 
up bodies, randomly shot at civilians, razed villages in fashion reminiscent 
of Genghis Khan, shot cattle and dogs for fun, poisoned food stocks, and 
generally ravaged the countryside of South Vietnam in addition to the 
normal ravage of war.198  
The atrocities committed by some American GIs in Vietnam indirectly strengthened the 
DRV propaganda message in favor of communism and were a huge lesson for the U.S. to 
remember in future conflicts.  
The American POW presence in Vietnam eventually influenced Congress to 
implement several bills in protest of the Vietnam War. In June 1971, the U.S. Senate 
voted for the Mansfield Amendment, which required all American GIs to vacate Vietnam 
within nine months,199 contingent on U.S. POWs being released by the NVA.200 The 
exact treatment of American GIs held by the NVA was not fully understood until 1973, 
following the Paris Agreement.201 On 27 January 1973, the Paris Agreement (or Peace 
Accords) was signed in Paris between the Viet Cong, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, 
and the U.S., formally ending the Second Indochina War.202 The Paris Agreement also 
acknowledged both sides were to release POWs; the U.S. would vacate Vietnam, and 
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North Vietnam would not cross the DMZ to invade South Vietnam.203 American POWs 
described the inhumane treatment they had received as NVA captives, revealing that the 
NVA had not followed the 1949 Geneva Conventions under Article 13,204 which states 
that “measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.”205 Finally, after the 
U.S. withdrew from Vietnam and POWs were released, Congress enacted the War 
Powers Act in 1973 to prevent future U.S. presidents from deploying American forces 
without Congressional approval.206 The accumulation of events through the Tet 
Offensive and the alleged GI war crimes publicized by American media directly 
deepened American discontent with the Vietnam War.  
6. Direct [to Indirect] Military Support 
Direct military support was probably the most important element for the DRV’s 
guerrilla operations against the U.S. and South Vietnam. Direct support is considered 
support that is intentionally contributed, and indirect support is considered unintentional 
and or unknowing. The DRV’s military support came from prominent countries: the 
Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and Cuba. The U.S. had no intention of escalating 
conflicts with these countries, which allowed them to transport military supplies and 
personnel to the NVA virtually unchallenged. 
The Soviet Union provided abundant military equipment and military personnel to 
sustain the communist campaign against the U.S. and South Vietnam, along with early 
warning systems. During the war, Soviet ships would identify U.S. B-52 bombers 
departing from Okinawa and Guam to Vietnam and quickly calculate their trajectories to 
notify the DRV and NVA. Between 1968 and 1970, U.S. B-52 bomber runs over 
Vietnam did not kill a single NVA soldier, thanks to these alerts.207 
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The Soviets provided the NVA with weaponry more modern than the NVA 
possessed (see Table 3), along with military advisors (see Table 4). The NVA received 
approximately “2,000 tanks, 7,000 artillery guns, [more than] 5,000 anti-aircraft guns, 
and 158 surface-to-air [missiles (SAM)], … [along with] oil, machinery, and spare 
parts.”208 Between 1965 and 1972, the Soviets gave NVA 95 missile complexes and 
7,658 SAMs.209 Alien Wars: The Soviet Union’s Aggressions against the World, 1919–
1989, provides a table of Soviet military equipment sent to the NVA from 1965–1972 
Table 3.   Soviet Military Equipment Provided to the NVA, 1965–1972.210 
 
 
The Soviet Union also sent the NVA military advisors, approximately 15,000 
personnel over the course of the war.211 Alien Wars also provides a table of Soviet 
personnel in Vietnam from 1965–1972. 
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Table 4.   Soviet Personnel Provided to the NVA, 1965–1972.212 
 
 
The PRC sent direct military support in the form of military equipment (see 
Table 5), personnel, and food. The PRC provided the DRV with four air defensive 
divisions, one antiaircraft division, and fifteen MIG-15 and MIG-17 planes.213 In the 
summer of 1962, the PRC donated 90,000 rifles and ammo.214 China and the Vietnam 
Wars, 1950–1975, gives a table of PRC military equipment sent to the DRV from 1964–
1975. 
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Table 5.   China Military Aid to the DRV, 1964–1975.215 
 
 
The PRC also provided military personnel and advisors, along with food so DRV 
personnel could sustain guerrilla operations. Author Zhai reports in China and the 
Vietnam Wars that 320,000 PRC troops served in Vietnam between June 1965 and March 
1968, reaching a peak in 1967 with the participation of Chinese 170,000 troops.216 In 
addition, the PRC sent food for troops and local Vietnamese. Brantly Womack estimates 
in China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry that the PRC provided five million tons 
of food during their Vietnam War support period, equal to the annual Vietnamese food 
consumption. In 1966 alone, the PRC provided 10 percent of Vietnam’s food.217 
North Korea, another procommunist country, supported the DRV campaign 
primarily by providing aerial military logistics. According to Vietnamese air defense 
history, North Korea provided military support to the DRV during the Vietnam War.218 
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Pribbenow stated in “The ‘Ology War: Technology and Ideology in the Vietnamese 
Defense of Hanoi, 1967” that North Korea had a fighter regiment covertly replace the 
NVA 921st and 923rd fighter regiments while executing covert missions in a denied 
area.219 Approximately 200 North Korean pilots were sent to Vietnam to help protect 
Hanoi.220 
Cuba offered the DRV engineers, military advisors, and prison guards. On 4 
November 1999, Michael Benge, who served as a civilian economic development officer 
in South Vietnam, stated before the House International Relations Committee that Cuba 
sent several thousand engineers to Vietnam to support the construction, repairs, and 
guarding of the essential Ho Chi Minh Trail the NVA used during the war.221 
According to the P.O.W. Network, Benge reported that the Cuban intelligence 
agency, the Directorate of Intelligence (DGI), ran an initiative called the Cuban Program 
in which Cuban guards tortured American POWs.222 Former POW John McCain noted in 
his 2000 memoir Faith of My Fathers seeing Cuban guards in POW base “Camp Unity” 
during the Vietnam War attempting to break Americans or torture them to death.223 In 
2008, Fidel Castro denied that McCain had been tortured by Cuban guards during the war 
as he had claimed.224 
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Like the French–Algerian War, the events of the Vietnam War show the 
importance of external support to insurgencies. Record explains in Why the Strong Lose 
that “it seems no less reasonable to conclude that highly motivated and skilled insurgents 
can be defeated if denied access to external assistance and confronted by a strong side 
pursuing a strategy of barbarism against the insurgency’s civilian population base.”225 
The Vietnam War displayed how safe haven and transit can assist in shuttling supplies, 
personnel, and military support to an insurgency. Financial resources from state actors 
proved important for the insurgency, especially given their lack of efficient means to 
generate funds. Political assistance was vital as support for the insurgency’s narrative and 
arms struggle against anticommunist nations. The DRV insurgency executed their 
propaganda strategy both internally and externally while indirectly benefiting from U.S. 
media actions. The NVA lacked the military resources and technological advances to 
confront the United States and South Vietnam, but with external procommunist 
assistance, they turned the outcome of the war. The U.S. had failed to study the 
importance of external support in the First Indochina War, resulting in approximately 
58,000 Americans dead in Vietnam. 
C. ISLAMIC STATE 
The third case study this thesis will look at to identify trends in external 
insurgency support is IS. This case study will provide a brief background on IS, then will 
evaluate the five external support elements—safe haven and transit, financial resources, 
political support, propaganda, and direct military support—for IS.226 This thesis will use 
the term intrastate to refer to the countries of Iraq and Syria, and interstate will include 
the remaining relevant countries for IS. This case study will cover IS from its inception 
until August 2016. 
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1. Islamic State Background 
Between 1968 and 2003, the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party ruled Iraq, providing 
economic growth and soaring prosperity through oil revenues. In 2003, the U.S., along 
with the Coalition Provisional Authority, toppled Saddam Hussein and ended the Iraqi 
Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party. The Coalition Provisional Authority consisted of the U.S., 
United Kingdom (UK), Australia, and Poland. Iraq’s inadequate domestic political 
reform plan and the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 created an opportunity for an 
insurgency force like IS to emerge. IS originated in Iraq and has since expanded globally. 
IS evolved to fill a void left in the Middle East, disrupting the existence of many 
through genocide of ethnic groups, extortion, and unjust governing throughout Iraq and 
Syria. IS has demolished cultural heritage sites in Iraq and Syria, including mosques and 
shrines, churches, and ancient and medieval sites. This destruction track has forced the 
displacement of millions. The United Nations reported that IS’s insurgency has forced 
more than three million Iraqis to become refugees and relocate.227 
IS has managed to develop an enormous international support infrastructure, 
which, as author Bruce J. Reider has stated, is imperative for an insurgency force to 
sustain operations.228 IS is using online social networks, Dabiq (a propaganda magazine), 
preachers, and, theoretically, a caliphate. A caliphate, if recognized, would reactivate 
dormant Islamic law, requiring devout Muslims to migrate to the territory occupied by 
the caliph. This has facilitated funding, equipment, weapons, safe passage, alliances, and 
personnel including foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and wives for IS insurgents. In 
spring 2015, the U.S. intelligence community established, as a conservative estimate, that 
IS’s insurgency included between 9,000 and 18,000 fighters.229  
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IS was able to capitalize on an ideal insurgency environment in Iraq to expand in 
the Middle East. A variety of processes caused discontent among the Iraqi Sunni 
population, which IS used to their advantage. Sunnis, who are not the majority 
population, were politically disenfranchised when the Iraqi government came under Shia-
Kurdish control following the de-Ba’athification process. This process aimed to rid Iraq 
of the Ba’ath Party, which reigned from 1968–2003. The Saddam regime collapse in 
2003 “also ended centuries of Sunni control of Iraq and empowered Shia Muslims and 
ethnic Kurds.”230 The Sunnis were ousted from Iraqi governmental power due to their 
violent means and separatist actions regarding domestic issues and their constantly 
addressing “old [religious] frames of reference.”231 The Shiites and Kurds came to 
dominate the new Iraqi government. The Sunnis began striving for the Iraqi presidency 
once again to obtain better representation. However, even if Sunni leaders could win the 
Iraqi presidency, the new Sunni governing strategy was not acceptable to “radical Sunnis 
who wanted the discontented Sunni population to take up arms against Baghdad [the Iraqi 
government].”232  
Several events led to the displacement and unemployment that pushed Sunnis to 
become fighters. As reported in the Washington Post, shortly after the Saddam regime 
fell in spring 2003, “400,000 members of the defeated Iraqi army were barred from 
government employment, denied pensions—and also allowed to keep their guns.”233 The 
disbanding of the regime army forced many angry Sunnis to find food and work to 
provide for their families. The Sunnis began to resent Shias, Kurds, Yazidis, Jews, 
Americans, and coalition forces and began to bond among themselves as a community.  
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The blueprints of IS developed long before the group appeared as a threat. There 
are many players involved in the current IS conflict, some of whom go by multiple 
names. Patrick Johnston, Jacob Shapiro, Howard Shatz, Benjamin Bahney, Danielle Jung, 
Patrick Ryan, and Jonathan Wallace, trace back the linage of the Islamic State back to the 
1990s, when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi established Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (an 
insurgent Jihadist group) while in Jordan.234 Zarqawi then when on to operate in Iraq.235 
Johnston et al., explained eventually, in 2004, Zarqawi’s Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad 
pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, which merged into al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and this 
alliance lasted until 2006. AQI rebranded once again in October 2006 as the Islamic State 
of Iraq (ISI), which lasted until 2013.236 The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 
was created in April 2013, before the group finally took on its current name of the 
Islamic State in June 2014 with the declaration of a supposed caliphate.237 
After the death of Haji Bakr, a former Iraqi Army colonel in the intelligence 
service, in January 2014, local Iraqi rebels discovered documents detailing how IS could 
have been developed.238 In 2003, after the Saddam regime fell, Haji Bakr, also known as 
Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi, like many other Sunni fighters, became unemployed. 
This forced him to go into hiding, where he linked up with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the 
Anbar province of Iraq. Zarqawi was considered more radical than Osama Bin Laden and 
helped develop Bakr’s ideology. From 2006–2008, Bakr was confined to U.S. military’s 
Camp Bucca and Abu Ghraib war prison.239 During this time, Bakr managed to socialize 
with other jihadists and began to develop an intricate network, along with plans for 
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developing the Islamic State. Bakr constructed these plans using his military training and 
prior experience in the Saddam regime, which had depended on spreading fear.  
Bakr’s designs consisted of opening dawah offices (see footnote 240) and Islamic 
missionary centers throughout Iraq and Syria.240 These centers seemed innocent enough 
and allowed Bakr to embed spies to achieve a variety of objectives. Christoph Reuter 
defined the different objectives Bakr used to embed spies in his article “Secret Files 
Reveal the Structure of Islamic State”: 
[Gather lists of] the powerful families. Name the powerful individuals in 
these families. Find out their sources of income. Name names and the size 
of (rebel) brigades in the villages. Find out the names of their leaders, who 
controls the brigades, and their political orientation. Find out their illegal 
activities (according to Sharia law), which could be used to blackmail 
them if necessary.241 
Bakr had the dawah offices say nothing about IS and only mention “[we are] 
brothers” when someone entered.242 For the missionary and dawah centers, Bakr only 
selected intelligent individuals to become Sharia sheiks, training them to support the 
developing IS. Bakr also had Sunnis marry into influential families to gain a competitive 
edge and local tribal protection. Spies also implemented this strategy in the “finance, 
school, daycare, media and transportation areas.”243 
After the position of Prime Minister was turned over fourteen times following the 
collapse of Saddam Hussein in 2003, in May 2006, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki 
(2006–2014) took office. Maliki represented a shift in Iraq from the rule of Sunni dictator 
Saddam Hussein to a Shia sectarian prime minister. The same year, Iraq was facing an 
influx of al-Qaeda insurgent fighters creating havoc.244 In 2006, AQI fighters lacked 
knowledge about governing or supporting towns, which meant they had little support 
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from the local population. AQI also wanted to minimize the possibility of non-extremist 
Sunnis being involved in politics within Iraq, to prevent the compromises this could lead 
to.245 Such political compromises would bring non-extremist Sunnis into a more 
legitimate political position and therefore make them more subject to Iraqi government 
rule, forgoing the perceived support AQI could offer. The Sunni locals of Anbar 
Province, Iraq, eventually became infuriated and decided to unite to counter the relentless 
insurgency violence. In 2006, a tribal leader and Iraqi military officer established the 
Anbar Awakening, which was followed by the Sons of Iraq (SOI) in 2007, to counter 
AQI, which was then under its new name ISI. The U.S. military sponsored the Anbar 
Awakening operation.  
The Anbar Awakening created more tensions throughout Iraq than expected. 
Anbar Awakening fighters grew to 70,000, which petrified the Iraq government, since the 
Shiite majority army and police consisted of only 440,000.246 As reported by USA Today, 
the Iraq government had different plans for the Sunni group once the U.S. military 
stopped funding them: 
Iraq’s Shiite-led government has said that American-backed Sunni groups 
key to battling Islamic extremists will not be allowed to become a separate 
military force and must be eventually disbanded.247 
Experts warned the Iraqi government to provide jobs for the Sunni fighters before 
eliminating their funding, and Iraq planned accordingly to absorb “25 percent of the 
Sunni fighters into security” positions.248 The Iraqi government matched the “$155 
million the U.S.” designated for “employment creation” for the Sunni fighters, but 
analysts were concerned about the 75 percent of Sunni fighters remaining 
unemployed.249 







The Iraqi government would realize the mistake of not employing more Sunni 
fighters. The government employed 3,000 Sunni fighters to work alongside the Iraqi 
military, hoping the newly hired Sunni fighters could also provide HUMINT about 
“militant activity in the area.”250 The Shiite militia force of Iraq was dominant but lacked 
Sunni support because of prior human rights violations.251 The Iraqi government also 
faced a growing unemployment problem with experienced Sunni fighters from the 
disbanded Anbar Awakening movement. This created an enormous opportunity for ISI 
not only to absorb seasoned fighters but also to support their insurgency movement. 
The Arab Spring (also known as the Arab Awakening and not to be confused with 
the Awakening in Iraq from 2007–2008) presented changes needed which ISI prophesied 
they could support through just governing with an Islamic State. In December 2010, the 
Arab community throughout Africa and the Middle East stood up to their governing 
regimes. The article “The Arab Awakening,” by Rami Khouri, defined the grievances 
spurring the turning point that developed after years of people being denied: 
their human rights and their citizenship rights, the result of decades of 
socioeconomic stresses and political deprivations. These include petty and 
large-scale corruption; police brutality; abuse of power; favoritism; 
unemployment; poor wages; unequal opportunity; inefficient or nonexistent 
public services; lack of freedom of expression and association; state control 
of media, culture, and education; and many other dimensions of the modern 
Arab security state.252  
The majority of participating Arabs in the Arab Spring movement were between 15 and 
29 years old.253 The lack of work and basic state services and the inability to afford a 
home resulted in delays to people’s hopes of getting married. All this put immense stress 
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on Generation Y. Arab youth suffered from these economic difficulties and political 
repressions. 
The protesting Arab communities’ resentment emerged in response to Arab 
regimes, Israel, and the United States. This resentment was brought by from regime 
dictatorships, Israel’s actions in Palestine and Lebanon, and U.S. involvement in the 
Middle East. Most Arab citizens believed that Arab leaders catered to international 
demands and hoarded wealth for themselves. As detailed in the Nation, the Arab Spring’s 
goals were to bring “basic rights of the citizen and citizenry, … legitimate state authority 
that is accountable to the people’s demand for social justice … the birth of politics, [and 
an end goal concluding with] national sovereignty and self-determination.”254 The Arab 
Spring presented economic downturns and ethnic division, which aligned with supporting 
ISI, if ISI could provide the governing needs that dictators and regime leaders had 
neglected.  
The Arab Spring resulted in citizens uniting to develop organic social movements 
throughout the Arab world. These movements were fueled by the removal of corrupt 
Arab leaders. Unfortunately, they were often unable to empower the overthrown leaders’ 
political successors. This resulted in a volatile Middle East, which allowed ISI to exploit 
political opportunities. 
In the summer of 2011, ISI headed into Syria to support resistance fighters against 
the Shiite government of Bashar al-Assad. The Syrian Civil War had grown out of the 
Arab Spring social movement and now offered ISI an opportunity to expand its 
organizational strength by connecting Al Anbar, Iraq, to Syria through the Syrian Desert. 
By moving into Syria, ISI instantly increased their recruitment population and operating 
area. Once there, ISI strategically attacked oil fields for self-sustainment and conducted 
border-breaking operations between Iraq and Syria to encourage a borderless IS.255 The 
Syrian Civil War became a crucial opportunity for ISI. 
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In 2013, under the new name ISIL, the organization furthered their insurgency 
narrative through events at a protest and a prison break. In April 2013, while Sunnis held 
a peaceful protest in Hawija, Iraq, in an attempt to gain recognition by the Iraqi 
government, a few ISIL insurgents infiltrated the Sunni protest and apparently killed an 
Iraqi police officer.256 The morning of 23 April 2013, Maliki had the Iraqi SWAT 
confront the peaceful protest, resulting in hundreds of innocent dead Sunnis.257 On 21 
July 2013, ISIL concentrated on Abu Ghraib, Iraq, to strengthen their fighting force. The 
prison break resulted in approximately 500 freed inmates (and also delivered a huge 
propaganda message), strengthened their fighting numbers, and supported HUMINT 
gathering from Saddam supporters, Sunni tribesmen, and former Ba’ath leaders.  
Finally, in December 2013, the Sunni population in Iraq held a peaceful protest in 
Ramadi, fueled by sectarian ethnic divisions, with prominent Sunni figures speaking. The 
Ramadi protest was interrupted at Maliki’s request, and Sunni parliamentarian Ahmed al-
Alwani was arrested for speaking, despite his parliamentary immunity. His brother and 
sister were killed.258 On 31 December 2013, the Iraqi army withdrew from Ramadi and 
Fallujah, hoping that tribesmen would enforce local law and keep ISIL out. However, 
after the recent protest and the lack of trust in the Iraqi government, the local tribesmen 
refused to confront the influx of ISIL insurgents. To counter the overthrow of Ramadi 
and Fallujah, the Iraqi government shelled the cities at random, hoping to kill insurgents. 
In Fallujah, 25 women and children were killed by shelling in August 2015.259 The 
actions by the Iraqi government further divided the Sunnis and Shia-Kurdish populations, 
presenting another excellent opportunity for ISIL to leverage Sunni animosity.260 
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In June 2014, the newly named IS set their next target: Mosul, Iraq, population 
1.8 million. IS managed to conquer Mosul with just 800 fighters and the help of a local 
Ba’ath military cadre, who provided invaluable intelligence. IS confiscated the Iraqi 
stockpile of weapons the United States had provided and moved on to overtake 
Qayyarah, al-Shirqat, Hawija, and Tikrit.261 All of these opportunities greatly supported 
the expansion of IS and reinforced their justification through a strong Islamic State (see 
Figure 8).  
In June 2014, IS declared Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi caliph, believing this would 
support their legitimacy in the Muslim community.262 Declaring a caliph was significant, 
as the last caliph had died 90 years before.263 By trying to establish a caliph, IS was 
attempting to emulate the power structure of the Prophet Muhammad, considered the last 
prophet sent from God, giving him supreme authority to reign over the land he controls. 
On 29 June 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi preached in Mosul, Iraq.264 Not only did 
Baghdadi speak in the Great Mosque of al-Nuri, but he also spoke in broad daylight, 
something no other insurgent leader had yet done. This was a monumental moment for 
IS, strengthening their cause for statehood collective actions, motivating jihadis to join 
IS, and ramping up their propaganda message. IS supporters argued that having a caliph 
reestablished dormant Koranic, law requiring all Muslims to immigrate to the land where 
caliph law is applied.265 These events supported the strategic framing for IS.  
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Figure 8.  ISIS Sanctuary, 10 June 2014.266 
2. Post-declaration of an Islamic State Caliph  
In the year after the announcement of the caliphate, IS made rapid gains across 
Iraq, Syria, and the Levant. In July 2014, IS took over the largest oilfield in Syria.267 This 
supported their financial strategy of becoming self-sustained through natural resources. In 
August 2014, IS attacked the town of Sinjar, which has a primarily Yazidi population 
(see footnote).268 During the Sinjar attack, IS killed over 500 Yazidi and forced 
approximately 30,000 families to seek safety in the mountains nearby. In November 
2014, following the Yazidi massacre, the UN Independent International Commission 
declared that IS had “committed war crimes and crimes against humanity.”269  
                                                 
266 Source: Institute for the Study of War, “ISIS Sanctuary Map: June 10, 2014,” 3 August 2015, 
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-sanctuary-map-june-10-2014. 
267 “ISIS Fast Facts,” CNN Library, accessed 5 August 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/
isis-fast-facts/. 
268 Ibid.; The Yazidi population is considered ethnically Kurdish, an ethnic minority throughout Iraq, 
Syria and the Levant, and include their own independent religious groups. 
269 Ibid. 
 66 
IS managed to overrun cities in Iraq and Syria key for population control and as 
strategic locations. In May 2015, IS stormed Ramadi, Iraq, after Iraqi security forces had 
retreated.270 Seizing Ramadi furthered an IS strategy of financial extortion. In May 2015, 
IS took over Palmyra, Syria, a strategic border crossing between Syria and Iraq enforced 
by Syrian troops. This moved them closer to their utopian idea of IS expansion through a 
borderless Middle East. In June 2015, the U.S. State Department’s annual terrorist report 
revealed the enormity of an IS global threat—IS had become a more significant domestic 
threat than al-Qaeda.271 
In October 2014, a coalition of more than 60 countries (but few troops on the 
ground) united to counter the fight against IS,272 which began to impact IS military 
presence and networks. A leadership change supported a unilateral strategy in September 
2014, with Shia Haider al-Abadi taking office as the new Iraqi prime minister, replacing 
Maliki. In January 2015, U.S. officials claimed that anti-IS airstrikes had killed 
approximately 6,000 fighters and estimated between 9,000 and 18,000 IS fighters 
remaining.273 In February 2015, President Obama asked Congress for backing to use U.S. 
military forces, after the death of U.S. aid worker Kayla Jean Mueller was reported. 
Kayla Mueller’s death enraged Americans about IS’s unchecked expansion and brutality 
in the Middle East. Following President Obama’s request for U.S. troops in Iraq, IS 
began to experience catastrophic shortfalls. The Iraqi Army was able to reclaim the 
majority of Tikrit from IS strongholds in March 2015; given Tikrit’s population of 
approximately 160,000, this put constraints on IS by reducing their collection of local 
taxes. In May 2015, U.S. Special Forces killed Abu Sayyaf in a Syrian raid and captured 
his wife.274 CNN reported that Abu Sayyaf had been a highly networked “senior [IS] 
leader who, among other things, had a senior role in overseeing [IS] illicit oil and gas 
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operations.”275 The Sayyaf raid generated significant intelligence on IS structure and 
communications,276 along with a huge anti-IS propaganda message that coalition forces 
could identify and execute precision attacks against high-value targets (HVT) with ease.  
Between June 2015 and August 2016, IS has faced numerous setbacks in 
operations and finance. In June 2015, for the first time, a U.S. Army general described 
how the U.S. had been able to track and target an IS fighter through a selfie posted on 
social media. Only 22 hours after the selfie was posted, airstrikes were being 
conducted.277 In July 2015, IHS Jane’s, a British defense-analysis open-source company, 
estimated that IS had lost approximately 9.4 percent of their controlled territory during 
the first half of 2015.278 This report demonstrated that defeating and eliminating IS is 
possible, by reducing IS sanctuaries within Iraq and Syria through unilateral operations. 
October 2015 saw the beginning of Operation Tidal Wave II, a U.S.-led coalition 
campaign to disrupt IS oil operations and financial revenue.279 The operation mirrored 
the World War II Operation Tidal Wave, which was executed to deny Axis powers access 
to Romania’s oil industry.280 The campaign reportedly decreased IS oil revenue by 30 
percent, based on coalition calculations.281 Next, the campaign targeted IS-controlled 
banks, which stored essential cash. In one incident in January 2016, airstrikes against 
banks in Mosul destroyed between “tens of millions [and] a billion” IS dollars.282 By 
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early 2016, IS was beginning to face oil-field losses from Operation Tidal Wave II; along 
with declining oil prices, this created an immense financial burden.  
Also during Operation Tidal Wave II, IS began to lose control of sanctuary cities 
and essential networked individuals. In November 2015, Iraqi Kurdish forces announced 
they had reclaimed the town Sinjar from IS. The Kurdish forces were supported by U.S. 
coalition air strikes.283 In December 2015, Abu Saleh, the IS finance minister, was killed 
by coalition airstrikes. Also in December, the Iraqi Army retook Ramadi from IS and 
raised an Iraqi flag over the local government building. In March 2016, U.S. officials 
announced that the new IS finance minister, Abd al-Rahman Mustafa al-Qaduli, had also 
been killed by U.S. forces.284 Recently, in June 2016, an Iraqi general announced that the 
Iraqi Army had reclaimed Falluja from IS.285 The retaking of Sinjar, Ramadi, and Falluja 
and the HVT killings of finance ministers presented a huge propaganda setback, along 
with the loss of potential financial revenue for IS (see Figure 9).  
For the remainder of the case study, this thesis will refer to this insurgency as IS, 
unless I am emphasizing a time period during which the group used a different name. 
This thesis will now discuss the five external support elements for insurgency: safe haven 
and transit, financial resources, political support, propaganda, and direct military 
support.286 
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Figure 9.  ISIS Sanctuary, 1 July 2016.287 
3. Safe Haven and Transit 
Safe haven and transit are imperative for insurgents to sustain recruitment through 
foreign fighters, to receive supplies, to travel safely within their operating area, and to 
support training. In June 2016, the U.S. Department of State released the Country Report 
on Terrorism 2015, and defined safe havens to be “ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-
governed physical areas where terrorists are able to organize, plan, raise funds, 
communicate, recruit, train, and operate in relative security because of inadequate 
governance capacity, political will or both.”288 The conflict-wracked states of Iraq and 
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Syria have provided safe havens for training opportunities in weapons firing, tactical 
movement drills, and technical bomb-making skills.289 Safe haven can also offer 
unrestricted communication for IS with the following: al-Qaeda in Syria (al-Nusra Front), 
the Free Syrian Army (opposition force), the Assad regime, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the 
Iranian Quds (Jerusalem) Corps. In April 2015, the U.S. Department of State released a 
list of the countries that offer terrorist safe havens in the Middle East: Egypt, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Libya, and Yemen.290 Georgia, Cyprus, Bulgaria, and Turkey have also 
indirectly provided safe havens to IS. 
Georgia, Cyprus, and Bulgaria do not share borders with IS sanctuaries but still 
indirectly provide safe haven and transit. Due to Georgia’s strategic geographic location, 
bordering Russia, Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, Georgia has become a transit route 
for IS recruits. Georgia’s remote Pankisi Gorge, which is near the Chechen-Georgian 
border and is 13 km long by three km wide, offers a safe passage for foreign fighters.291 
Recruitment enabled by transit and weak borders is essential for IS to sustain insurgency 
operations. Cyprus, too, has become a staging area and leap point into Turkey from 
Northern Cyprus through daily ferries. A February 2015 Wall Street Journal article by 
Maria Abi-Habib and Joe Parkinson described the dilemma of countering the Cyprus 
transit, which is complicated by the fact that the international community fails to 
recognize the Turkish-inhabited north that impedes extradition and vital intelligence 
sharing.292 Abi-Habib and Parkinson also explained that the 170 miles of border between 
Bulgaria and Turkey has proven invaluable for potential jihads transiting to and from 
Syria through Turkey. Despite Bulgaria increasing its border presence and accepting U.S. 
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military border training, the 170 miles still remain vulnerable at night, according to one 
Bulgarian official.293 Identifying and eliminating these relaxed border areas has become 
extremely challenging for Iraq and Syria. 
By contrast, Turkey does border an IS sanctuary. Some states are inadvertently 
creating safe havens for IS by implementing refugee safe zones and supporting the rebels 
fighting Assad. It has been rumored that NATO ally Turkey has been aiding IS directly or 
indirectly. This is why for years the border crossing between Turkey and Syria has been 
called the jihadi highway.294 In 2015, Turkey and the U.S. agreed to implement an 
Islamic State–free zone, stretching across 68 miles of the Syrian-Turkish border, to 
support safe passage for fleeing refugees.295 Some fear that the proposed safe passage 
could increase an IS FTF presence.  
The bordering safe havens to IS-controlled territory in Iraq and Syria are part of 
how FTFs have been able to bring essential arms, equipment, and cash to aid IS. A 
February 2015 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) report revealed that IS had 
approximately 19,000 FTFs (Figure 10), based off U.S. official documents as of December 
2014.296 In March 2016, the Telegraph reported between 27,000 and 31,000 FTFs (Figure 
11) have traveled to IS sanctuary cities between Iraq and Syria in support of jihad. 
Significant in the Telegraph’s findings was that the Asian continent (see footnote) had 
contributed the most FTFs to IS, followed by Africa second and Europe third.297 
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Figure 10.  FTF by Country as of 31 December 2014.298 
 
 
Figure 11.  FTF from Top 10 Countries as of March 2016.299 
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The Combined Joint Task Force of the coalition forces agrees that Bashar al-
Assad must be removed from dictatorship, but worry about even more extremist safe 
havens springing up. The real dilemma is that if Assad is removed from power, his 
removal could create an immense vacuum for IS or future extremist groups to expand and 
possibly control the Syrian capital, creating further safe haven and transit opportunities 
for the IS and possible generating essential local population support.  
4. Financial Resources 
Insurgents must acquire financial resources in order to expand and sustain 
operations. IS does receive external funding but primarily relies on internal funding. IS’s 
four means of funding are donations, kidnap and ransom, extortion, and selling of natural 
resources acquired within Iraq and Syria.300 They have also implemented a very 
sophisticated system for shuttling funds to and from IS-controlled territory to elude 
detection. U.S. Treasury Undersecretary David Cohen outlined three ways to disrupt IS’s 
financial resources: “cutting off IS’s access to revenue, restricting IS’s access to the 
international financial system, and targeted sanctions against IS’s leadership and 
facilitators.”301 The Center for the Analysis of Terrorism (CAT) released an IS strategy 
obtained from internal documents: “The wealth of the State is the principle component 
and source of financing for all internal and external operations, and the existence of 
secure financial resources whose value does not change in every time and place is a 
must.”302 
 IS has implemented the wealth of the State strategy through an organized 
financial hierarchy. IS’s Ministry of General Finance is the department that collects local 
taxes and is one of eight ministries that report directly to al-Baghdadi.303 A global 
marketing campaign allowed IS to receive funding of up to $2 million per day in 
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September 2014, which supports creative online fundraising methods.304 IS revenue 
declined by almost 16 percent from 2014 to 2015, from $2.9 billion to $2.435 billion 
(Figure 12).305  
 
Figure 12.  ISIS Sources of Revenue, 2014–2015 (Mean Scores).306 
a. Sources of Funding  
The CAT stated that in 2015, IS received up to $50 million in donations.307 IS has 
received private donations from wealthy businessmen, religious leaders, and NGOs, 
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mostly from Persian Gulf countries consisting of Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, 
Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.308 This is partly because the Sunni IS has appeared to be the 
only dominating force against the Shia political power of Bashar al-Assad, whose actions 
during the 2011 Arab Spring morphed into the current Syrian Civil War. Less-wealthy 
foreign supporters who cannot travel to fight alongside IS have turned to 
microfinancing.309 These donations are extremely difficult for authorities to detect and 
deter due to the relatively small monetary values being transferred.  
IS’s three major ways for generating funds from foreigners are online 
crowdfunding, fraud and theft, and business-related fraud.310 The FATF also explained 
that IS’s rapid social media expansion allowed them to make use of Twitter storms and 
crowdfunding. Twitter storms are messages that reoccur and go viral to support future 
funding. Crowdfunding is a technique used by companies to solicit donations from mass 
groups of people through technology and marketing.311 The CTC Sentinel reported that 
IS is successfully crowdfunding in the Gulf States and possibly recently in Europe.312 
The CTC Sentinel also reported that a significant number of foreign supporters for 
IS have prior criminal convictions, which means fraud and theft may be common traits 
among them. Many IS foreign supporters practice bank fraud, withdrawing loans with no 
intention of repaying them.313 Ranstorp notes vehicle loans as the most common fraud 
practice by foreign supporters—supporters can walk away with cash and possibly also a 
vehicle they can use to support IS directly.314 Finally, IS has benefitted from social 
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insurance fraud conducted by foreign supporters, and some supporters have even 
collected European government-assistance checks while operating in the Middle East.315 
Value added tax fraud (VAT fraud) is a very profitable business-related fraud 
foreign supporters use to generate large sums of money for IS. Figure 13 depicts one way 
a fraudulent VAT transaction can occur. There have been multiple cases of VAT fraud in 
which one individual charges a selling tax but does not claim it to taxing authorities. 
Usually, these schemes make use of a “fall guy,” allowing the masterminds to continue 
VAT scam operations.316 
 
Figure 13.  Value-Added Tax Fraud.317 
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IS also uses kidnap and ransom as a means of generating revenue. The CAT 
estimated that IS generated up to $100 million from kidnap and ransom in 2015. This 
strategy focuses on wealthy businessmen, political figures, religious leaders, and all 
foreigners. This source of revenue declined for IS in 2015 after people began avoiding 
their territory. In early 2015, IS released 200 Christians in exchange for several million 
dollars.318  
Yazidis are an ethnic minority IS is known to target. IS has generated up to 
$4,000 through Yazidi ransom sales. IS has also sold Yazidi women and children, who 
seem to generate the highest revenue.319 IS attempted to justify this through a fatwa 
stating women should be made sexually available to men conducting jihad to prevent 
them from becoming sexually frustrated during the war and allowing men to keep 
enslaved women for a duration of hours up to one week. The recorded amounts paid for 
Yazidi women under IS control are $170 for girls nine years old and younger, $130 for 
girls 10–20 years old, and $90 for women 20–30 years old.320  
IS also uses extortion as a means of generating revenue. The CAT estimated that 
IS generated up to $800 million in extortion activities in 2015. Extortion was also one of 
the only two revenue categories that increased in 2015. Extortion is leveraged through 
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Figure 14.  Types of Extortion by ISIS.322 
IS extorts several types of taxes from people, among which are religious taxes and 
protection money from Christians who live in the territories IS controls.323 This has been 
a significant source of income for IS, as they have eight million civilians living in their 
territory, many of whom are Christian. The number of Christians for IS to extort is 
decreasing, though—a March 2015 Newsweek article by Janine di Giovanni and Conor 
Gaffey revealed that Christians have dwindled from “20 percent [of the population of the 
Middle East] at the [beginning] of the 20th century to [only] 5 percent” as of March 
2015.324 Giovanni and Gaffey estimated the numbers of Christians living in Syria and 
Iraq as of March 2015 respectively at 400,000 and between 260,000 to 350,000.325 Until 
late 2015, IS was also collecting taxes from Iraqi government employees who lived in IS-
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controlled areas and leveraging between 10 and 50 percent of their government salaries in 
taxes. The Iraqi government faced the dilemma of cutting off government pay in IS-
controlled zones, which would support an IS propaganda message and create a 
humanitarian issue, or continuing to fund employees, which indirectly supported IS 
financially. Additionally, IS has implemented a custom tax on all commercial vehicles 
entering and leaving IS-controlled checkpoints, ranging from $400 to $600.326  
Fees and confiscations also support IS in sanctuary cities. A fee for water and 
electricity ranges from $1.25 to $2.50 per house. Telephone tax is collected at $1.25 per 
house.327 IS enforces a vehicle tax and a registration fee for schools and universities. This 
has not only made IS appear statelike, but it has also given it a continuous flow of funds 
like those a legitimate state. In terms of confiscations, houses owned by those who fled IS 
territory have been sold for profits, and IS has confiscated cars, trucks, land, cattle, and 
restricted goods including cigarettes.328 
IS also raises funds by seizing and selling natural resources from Iraq and Syria, 
which provided an estimated $1,455 billion in revenue in 2015. The five primary natural 
resources from which IS profits are oil, natural gas, phosphate, cement, and agriculture. 
Between 2014 and 2015, IS’s sales of natural resources declined by almost 39 percent.329 
This is primarily the result of territory lost to an aggressive strategy by coalition forces 
and Iraqi security forces (ISF). 
IS was making from $1 million to $2 million a day in oil revenue sales at their 
peak.330 What makes IS-controlled territory in Iraq and Syria especially important is that 
Iraq ranks fourth globally in oil exports.331 Between 2014 and 2015, IS oil revenue 
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declined by almost 45 percent.332 According to the CAT, IS has run into problems with 
recruiting competent individuals and with depleting oil wells. The CAT also explained 
how IS is able to maintain relatively high oil prices: a highest-bidder selling strategy and 
control of the local oil industry, which forces many to purchase oil despite IS control. IS 
has also implemented a new selling strategy focusing on independent traders who can 
either sell on site or risk transporting crude or refined oil.333 
Natural gas is the second-highest natural resource revenue source for IS.334 
However, between 2014 and 2015, IS natural gas revenue declined by almost 29 
percent.335 At their peak in 2015, IS operated only a dozen natural gas locations.336 The 
CAT described how producing natural gas is a more intricate process than preparing 
other natural resources for the market, and IS has recently lacked experienced operators, 
which has lowered their revenue. Controlling key natural gas locations has allowed IS to 
negotiate distribution deals with the Syrian regime and local companies.337  
Phosphate is the third-highest-profiting natural resource for IS.338 IS has 
confiscated mines in hopes of producing sulfuric acid and phosphoric acid.339 However, 
between 2014 and 2015, IS phosphate revenue dropped by almost 16 percent.340 
Transporting the material to ports for the landlocked extremist group has been 
challenging; combined with minimal sales returns, this makes it unlikely they will 
continue mining phosphate.341  
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Agriculture is the fourth-highest-profiting natural resource for IS. Between 2014 
and 2015, IS agriculture revenue diminished by almost 22 percent.342 IS primarily grows 
wheat, barley, and cotton in the Middle East, but aggressive military attacks, farming 
equipment shortages, infertile seeds, and distribution difficulties have drastically hurt 
their agriculture industry.343 
The final natural resource from which IS profits is cement.344 Between 2014 and 
2015, their cement revenue decreased by almost 65 percent.345 At IS’s height in 2014, 
they operated five cement plants, but from 2014–2016, they lost control of several of 
these plants, and a reduction in output further affected their cement revenue.346 
b. Methods of Moving Monetary Funds 
IS is constantly refining its international monetary system for moving funds while 
preventing detection. Confiscating local banks within Iraq and Syria allows IS to quickly 
acquire cash and to tap into the international banking network.347 The CAT stated that 
from 2014 to 2015, IS went from 125 seized banks within Iraq and Syria to 115.348 The 
seven main financial tools IS uses to transfer and receive monetary funds are electronic 
funds transfers (EFTs), money or value transfer systems (MVTSs), money service 
businesses (MSBs), the hawala system, Bitcoin, prepaid cards, and cash couriers.  
Controlling multiple financial institutions in Iraq and Syria has greatly benefited 
IS through EFTs, MVTSs, and MSBs. An EFT is a common monetary transaction 
between one financial institution and another. The majority of Iraqis and Syrians do not 
have financial accounts, requiring them to depend on other means such as MVTSs to 
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transfer funds.349 MVTS networks have been established through trusted brokers, and 
instead of relying on a bank wire transfer, they depend on “[sending] messages via email, 
fax, or telephone to a local or foreign associate to pay or receive payment from the 
counterparty to a transaction.”350 An MVTS deal is then resolved in the future through 
physical cash or bank transfers.351 An MSB provider is very similar to Western Union, 
which provides currency exchange services, but the ones IS uses have been exploited for 
money laundering to support terrorist activities. This is conducted through multiple small 
transactions to evade mandatory reporting, along with possibly employing a “smurfing or 
proxy technique” (see footnote) to prevent identification.352 
Another utilized technique is the hawala system, which has created a loophole for 
terrorist funding. Hawala is an informal monetary transfer system based on trust through 
developed networks of money brokers. The CAT illustrates how the hawala system 
works in Figure 15. The system has allowed IS to conduct import trading with Jordan and 
Turkey.353 In February 2015, Australian senator Jacqui Lambie noted that “[hawala] 
certifiers are not legally required to disclose their fees, nor is there a formal reporting or 
auditing system to ascertain whether funds are being misused.”354 The CAT also 
explained how difficult it would be to prevent unlawful transactions, since hawala is 
utilized by 50 percent of Iraqi businesses.355 It is believed that IS will rely more on the 
underground hawala system as they expand, since they will inevitably be denied access to 
the international banking system in the future.356 
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Figure 15.  The Hawala System.357 
Bitcoin (described in Figure 16) is a cryptocurrency that allows buying of 
electronic and tangible services or items. As Brooke Charles noted in an article for the 
website Security Intelligence, Bitcoin is “not contractually backed by assets or legal 
currency laws, it is not controlled by a central authority and it is not a tangible good. … 
                                                 
357 Source: Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, ISIS Financing: 2015, 24.  
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[It can be used by] anyone who has an Internet connection.”358 Fernanda Aboites in 
Egyptian Streets quotes the former undersecretary of the U.S. Treasury Department, who 
claimed that “Bitcoin is currently not regulated” and that terrorists “could have found a 
gap in [the U.S.] regulatory system that they may be exploiting.”359  
 
Figure 16.  How Bitcoin Works360 
Prepaid cards and cash couriers are probably the easiest methods of fund transfer 
to implement, and they are extremely hard to detect. Prepaid cards allow easy recharging 
without personal identity checks as long as the amount is less than $2,800 per year. Cash 
couriers can avoid financial regulations and detection, and they make movement of cash 
into Turkey possible through refugee travel. IS has turned this system into a bidirectional 
movement of funds, as FTFs bring cash into Iraq and Syria.361  
                                                 
358 Brooke Satti Charles, “ISIS. Are they using Bitcoins to Fund Criminal Activities?” Security 
Intelligence, 29 October 2014, https://securityintelligence.com/isis-are-they-using-bitcoins-to-fund-
criminal-activities/. 
359 Aboites, “What Keeps ISIS Running.”  
360 Source: Atlas ATS PowerPoint (5th slide), Indiegogo,” http://www.slideshare.net/atlasats/atlas-ats-
powerpoint-indiegogo. 
361 Ranstorp, “Microfinancing the Caliphate,” 14. 
 85 
5. Political Support 
Political support has traditionally come from state actors, but non-state actors will 
have to be considered in the future. It is difficult for an insurgency to acquire political 
assistance, but if they do, it can prove extremely beneficial. The 2015 U.S. Department of 
State document on states that sponsor terrorism did not identify any states that directly 
support IS. However, the document acknowledged that the Syrian government allowed 
safe passage for al-Qaeda’s foreign fighters into Iraq to engage coalition troops, 
indirectly supporting the rise of today’s IS.362  
Insurgents are more likely to receive indirect political support, which may benefit 
states. One major driver of political support in the Middle East is oil, often in ways which 
affect the global oil industry. An OpenOil article discusses how significant Syria could 
become in delivering oil and natural gas to Europe from the Middle East. Indeed, in 2009, 
the Assad regime realized Syria’s potential to unite the Persian Gulf, Black Sea, Caspian 
Sea, and Mediterranean Sea, and the “Pipelineistan” project was initiated to move in that 
direction.363 The project was halted shortly after the Syrian Civil war began in 2011. The 
current IS conflict has forced states to make political decisions between the sectarian 
dictator Assad, whose actions inflamed the Syrian Civil War and halted the Pipelineistan 
project, or the savage actions of the repressed Sunnis.  
Prospective alliances in the Middle East have also provided indirect political 
support for IS. Iran has been spotted targeting the Kurds, who are a major fighting force 
against IS and receive Western backing.364 It has been reported that Hezbollah and 
Iranian ground forces have supported the Assad regime in the fight against the rebels and 
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IS, backed by Russian air support.365 Both Iran and Russia believe Assad is the only 
viable state actor in the region, and their attacking the rebel forces has indirectly 
supported IS resilience—Iran and Russia’s actions help develop voids in the Middle East, 
which allow IS to expand. Countries have also been inclined to support Assad due to the 
strategic location of Syria and access to oil. These actions have built indirect military and 
political support for IS, which appear to go hand in hand.  
Although no state is overtly supporting IS, the insurgents have managed to find 
allies globally in the form of non-state actors, which could help in their struggle for 
political support. IS has received allegiances from the Abu Sayyaf group in the 
Philippines, Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, and Ansar Beit al-Maqdis in Egypt.366 In 
March 2015, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to IS.367 All these 
alliances have supported IS with FTFs, external financial donors, and possible IS-inspired 
foreign attacks.  
6. Propaganda 
The CAT reported in 2015 that in one year, IS was able to distribute 
approximately 15,000 propaganda messages, 800 videos, and 20 magazines in 11 
different languages.368 A propaganda campaign must incorporate an appealing message 
and reach the insurgents’ audience to be effective. The U.S. Army Field Manual defines 
propaganda as: 
Any form of communication in support of national objectives, designed to 
influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in 
order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.369 
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IS’s propaganda is disseminated through video, print, the Internet, and social media, in 
operations run by their information committee.370 Analyst Charlie Winter stated that the 
IS’s propaganda “has generated a comprehensive brand … composed of six non-discrete 
narratives—brutality, mercy, victimhood, war, belonging, and utopianism.”371 The IS has 
managed to constantly refine their propaganda through violence, developing different 
methods of distribution, and targeting population segments for specific purposes.  
a. Violence 
IS has managed to transform violence into a global propaganda message. Fear is 
one of the propaganda strategies used by IS to stand out among global insurgences. 
Insurgencies must assess their use of violence over the local population, as described in 
the equivalent response model, which states that the level and duration of violence over 
the local population must be considered to prevent a population polarization.372 IS has 
implemented their violent strategy through publicly released videos of killings, excessive 
violence locally, and orchestrated foreign attacks. In 2004, al-Qaeda was the first to 
release a beheading video of American contractor Nicholas Berg.373 In 2014, IS recorded 
the decapitations of journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff, humanitarian aides David 
Haines and Alan Henning, French national Hervé Gourdel, American national Peter 
Kassig, and Japanese citizens Haruna Yukawa and Kenji Goto, to name just a few.374 
When IS realized that beheadings were not receiving the attention they felt they deserved, 
they decided to implement new public killing methods. In June 2015, IS security officer 
Ayad Hamid Khalaf al-Jumaili (see footnote) recommended releasing videos of victims 
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being burned alive, drowning in cages, and being beheaded using explosives around their 
necks.375  
IS has also used violent measures against the Yazidis. Several Yazidi women 
captured by IS have attempted to rebel against their captives, and some even committed 
suicide with their own scarves before IS banned wearing scarves to prevent further 
financial losses.376 IS uses barbaric treatment of uncooperative women. One 20-year-old 
Yazidi lady was reported to have been burned alive after refusing extreme sexual 
demands. In another incident, a Yazidi woman who refused extreme sex was forced to eat 
her own child.377 The IS’s unimaginable savage acts of terror explain just how far they 
will go to finance their illegitimate state. 
IS’s global strategy has given the impression that they are stronger than they 
actually are. A recent increase in foreign attacks has spread this propaganda-based image 
of strength. In his 2016 book Governing the Caliphate: Profiles of Islamic State Leaders, 
Kyle Orton identified two possible reasons for the increase in IS foreign attacks. First, IS 
experienced defeats from 2008–2010 and an increase in HVT killings by coalition 
forces.378 Second, IS territories in Iraq and Syria were reduced by 45 percent and 16–20 
percent respectively between June 2014 and June 2016.379 Both of Orton’s possibilities 
suggest IS is weaker than perceived and using foreign attacks to cover the insurgency’s 
lack of regional strength. In a July 2016 analysis, the New York Times identified over 
1,200 foreign attack deaths outside of Iraq and Syria between September 2014 and July 
2016 with links to IS (Figure 17).380 
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Figure 17.  IS Foreign Attacks/IS-Inspired Attacks 
(September 2014–July 2016).381 
Orton also stated that IS-directed or IS-inspired foreign attacks would have taken 
several months to plan, evidence of a highly developed propaganda strategy. Between 21 
May 2016 and 29 July 2016, there were at least a dozen foreign attacks claimed by IS.382 
Kyle explains that most foreign attacks are not “lone wolf” attacks, but instead are 
normally planned by groups several months in advance, making them extremely hard to 
detect.383 Both lone wolf and group foreign terrorist attacks have provided direct and 
indirect propaganda support to IS. Orton broke down three categories in the execution of 
a foreign attack: command and control or directed, suggested or endorsed, and 
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inspired.384 This leads analysts to believe that IS has been plotting foreign attacks for 
years, which they are executing now even as they lose their utopian state.  
b. Developing Different Methods of Distribution  
IS has been able to disperse their propaganda through global and regional 
strategies. The information age has allowed them to broadcast their propaganda message, 
which is a key element of any insurgency’s external support structure. IS’s propaganda 
message has been implemented with more sophistication than the advertising of many 
U.S. businesses, and they have considerably improved their propaganda campaign since 
2014 with the help of the Internet.385  
Complete control of information about IS-controlled territory has also become a 
strategy. Due to the inherent danger of the region to journalists, the only information 
coming out of IS-controlled territory is their own messages. This has forced the 
international community to rely solely on IS-released propaganda, defected IS fighters, or 
confiscated documents. IS’s sanctuary strongholds are becoming black propaganda areas, 
“comprised [of] false information or half-truths,” compared to white propaganda, which 
consists of facts and creditable, cited information.386 A black propaganda area is not open 
to journalists or free speech, which makes gathering current information extremely 
difficult. 
The FATF, an independent intergovernmental entity that advocates policies to 
counter money laundering, terrorist funding, and procurement of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), described the multiple tiers that support IS’s propaganda campaign. 
IS has created the Al-I’tisam Establishment for Media Production and the more recent 
Al-Hayat Media Center, which concentrates on social media.387 Mah-Rukh Ali published 
a fellowship document while attending the University of Oxford in 2015, titled “ISIS and 
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Propaganda: How ISIS Exploits Women,” which identified the IS propaganda 
subdepartments: “Al-Furqan focuses on material that shows military strength, while Al-
I’tisam deals with ceremonial and religious activities.”388 This allows IS to refine their 
propaganda market segmentation for distinct global regions. 
The information age has rewritten the way social media can be used for a global 
propaganda message. In January 2015, a U.S. congressional committee reported that 
Twitter is the “gateway drug” (Figure 18) to cyber jihad radicalization, followed by Kik 
or WhatsApp, and eventually leading to secure chat applications.389 A 2016 RAND study 
found that in the last quarter of 2014, IS advocates ran 46,000 Twitter accounts, 20 
percent of which were in English.390 The January 2015 U.S. congressional committee 
report revealed several problems with confronting and eliminating IS social media 
propaganda. First is the idea of freedom of speech, which underpins almost all online 
posts, and second is the need for social media corporations’ cooperation. One Twitter 
official was reported saying, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”391  
IS has identified the many Internet applications that can be used for 
communication. Al-Qaeda made very grainy movies with virtually no editing, music, or 
computer graphics, then disseminated them through local TV/news stations to win over 
the population and recruit fighters. IS is using the Internet for its marketing networks, 
including Facebook, Ask.fm, Pinterest, YouTube, WordPress, and Tumblr.392 These 
applications have allowed IS to conduct bidirectional communication, which was not 
possible during the French–Algerian War or the Vietnam War. They are also using digital 
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magazines (Dabiq),393 websites, private chat rooms, and live online gaming chats 
(PlayStation Network). Dabiq magazine is translated into German, French, and English, 
making it more accessible to a global audience.394 A 14 November 2015 Forbes article 
by Paul Tassi explained how IS fighters may have used the PlayStation 4 to plan and 
execute the 13 November 2015 Paris attacks.395 IS has improved on al-Qaeda’s outdated 
marketing strategies by utilizing the Internet in all these ways. 
 
Figure 18.  Twitter Is the Gateway to Jihadi Propaganda.396 
IS has also implemented basic forms of local propaganda through preacher vans 
to spread their message, which helps them generate local support.397 A VICE News 
documentary described how IS uses a preacher van to spread the message of Islam and 
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the newly developed IS, focusing on underdeveloped areas where people have no Internet 
access.398 VICE News also reported that IS has a dedicated press officer whose job is to 
“win the hearts and minds of the local population, which supports Islamic State fighters 
and recruitment,” to prevent population polarization. The al-Bayan radio network was 
also established by IS to generate followers; it broadcasts in Russian, Arabic, and 
English. The radio station gives a general picture of IS’s suicide attacks and military 
campaigns.399 
c. Targeting Population Segments for Specific Purposes 
IS appears to be disseminating a broader propaganda message globally. In an 
article in Perspectives on Terrorism, Aaron Zelin analyzed one week of IS propaganda 
from 18–24 April 2015, revealing how IS had evolved into a “centralized 
decentralization” system through multiple online accounts, which allows them to adjust 
their operations if one online account is removed.400 Zelin also explained that the 
common failure to grasp the true magnitude of the IS propaganda machine is due to the 
Dabiq magazine being the only IS propaganda medium published in the English 
language. Only 6 percent of the propaganda Zelin identified was in English; 87 percent 
was in Arabic. Zelin’s research revealed that 88 percent of IS propaganda was in a visual 
medium, either in the form of pictures, videos, or graphics, and 48 percent of the 
propaganda was of military-type operations. Propaganda of military operations is likely 
designed to attract young men to engage in jihad, while visual propaganda could be used 
to compel young women to relocate and support IS fighters.  
Attempting to persuade women is just one example of IS’s propaganda-
segmentation strategy. Women can support IS through procreating, nurturing new 
generations of jihad fighters, and supporting their future husbands in jihad. IS developed 
their propaganda toward women through the release of a document in 2015 detailing 
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women’s basic roles/rights and those of the jihadi bride, specifically targeting women in 
societies ruled under fundamentalist Islam. The document, called “Women of the Islamic 
State: A Manifesto on Women by the Al-Khanssaa Brigdae,” was translated in February 
2015 by a British think-tank corporation, the Quilliam Foundation.401 It clearly defined 
women’s duties, what basic home economics classes they would receive, and under what 
circumstances they could leave their houses.402 In August 2016, a CTX article by Major 
Eric East described how Baghdadi has become more “progressive” toward women by 
allowing all women to attend grade schools and higher education and developing a 
female “shari’a police brigade called al-Khansa to go along with the all-male Hizbeh 
police force.”403 For the first time, women under fundamentalist Islam had a document 
clearly defining women’s basic roles, along with newly developed basic privileges, no 
matter how minuscule. 
The idea of being a jihadi bride has also attracted some Western women to join 
IS. Ali’s 2015 document reported “an estimated 500 European Muslim girls have made 
the journey abroad from their homes to join [IS].”404 Some IS-affiliated women within 
IS-controlled zones are posting happy daily family events, recipes they have cooked, and 
photos of their families and pets online. These women suggest that all good Muslim 
women have a duty to travel to Iraq and Syria outlined in sharia law and will be 
appreciated for supporting their families and fighting alongside their husbands. IS has 
even influenced young women in IS territory to recruit other women and help them travel 
to Iraq and Syria by advising them on appropriate clothing to bring and sanitation to 
expect.405 IS has managed to use propaganda to make living in the Middle East under 
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subpar conditions with an extremely violent extremist group seem appealing to some 
young women.  
7. Direct [to Indirect] Military Support 
The exact military support and equipment IS has acquired is uncertain. Though 
much of it was taken from Iraqi forces in 2014. Malcolm Nance, a former U.S. naval 
intelligence officer, identifies the kinds of weapons IS possess as of March 2016 in 
Defeating ISIS: Who They Are, How They Fight, What They Believe. Nance’s book lists 
the weapons that IS currently employs: armed vehicles, suicide car bombs, suicide 
pedestrian bombers, tanks and artillery, antitank weaponry, anti-aircraft guns, surface-to-
air missiles, chemical and biological weapons, small arms and machine guns, and 
drones.406 Nance’s book revealed how innovate IS has become with their weaponry.  
As discussed earlier, no state is believed to be supporting IS through overt, direct 
military support. Direct support is considered support that is intentionally contributed, 
and indirect support is considered unintentional and or unknowing. However, some Sunni 
states are speculated to have provided covert, indirect military support: Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey, Pakistan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. The Shia states that 
could counter IS’s insurgency are Iran, Syria, and Iraq, along with the Combined Joint 
Task Force which was established in October 2014 for that purpose, which includes 
personnel from more than 60 countries.407 
Iran is also believed to be supporting an IS expansion through indirect military 
actions. Iran’s Sunni militants have engaged the Kurdish minority forces. The Kurds are 
one of the dominating forces against IS, backed by Western forces.408 In August 2015, 
former Iowa National Guard soldier Ryan O’Leary went to Iraq intending to join Kurdish 
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forces and train them to counter IS.409 O’Leary was surprised to see the Iranian military 
repressing and killing the Kurds because the Kurds favored Western socialist democracy.  
Non-state actors can also support insurgencies, which sometimes leads to proxy 
conflicts. Proxy conflicts can benefit a state through their vested interests, while avoiding 
being seen by the international community as directly supporting an insurgency, thereby 
preventing a globalization calamity. Non-states that may have supported IS are the Sunni 
al-Qaeda and al-Nusra Front and possibly the Shia Hezbollah insurgency. Individuals 
also supply IS with arms through porous neighboring borders.  
8. Conclusion 
IS was able to expand because of events in Syria and Iraq linked to the Arab Spring, 
U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, and multiple failed states in the Middle East, and then exploited 
multiple areas to build and sustain their external support structure. Carl Von Clausewitz 
explained in On War that “before the battle, the two sides [are] in balance, real or assumed; 
this balance has now been upset, and an outside cause is needed to restore it. Without such 
external support, any further exertions will only result in further loss.”410  
IS developed financial strength through embedded networks that supported 
revenue via donations, kidnap and ransom, extortion, and selling of natural resources 
from Iraq and Syria. IS has become financially self-sustaining and able to forgo donations 
from wealthy individuals, which might influence the fighters’ agenda. Very little overt 
political support has been identified for IS, as states do not wish to be ostracized 
internationally. IS has rewritten the way propaganda is used by including bidirectional 
communication and encrypted chartrooms and eluding state efforts to block radical 
propaganda messages. Finally, IS military support includes confiscated military 
stockpiles and possibly covert aid from states or non-states. Understanding the rapid IS 
expansion can help determine how to mitigate future insurgencies. It can also support 
analysts in designing effective policy recommendations in the struggle against IS. 
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III. ISLAMIC STATE EXTERNAL SUPPORT IN CONTEXT 
Insurgencies have evolved as external support capabilities have developed, and 
likely will continue to do so. There have been enormous changes in external support in 
the last 60 years from the FLN to the NVA to IS, and some trends will probably continue. 
As successful insurgencies learn from their predecessors, this adaption could create new 
challenges for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. This chapter will look at all five 
external support areas as they relate to IS, then address the two research questions 
directly. The chapter will discuss applications in the continuing effort against IS and 
finally address areas for future research.  
A. ANALYZING ISLAMIC STATE EXTERNAL SUPPORT 
Patterns are emerging for insurgencies, including the role of the Internet, 
globalization, and revenue from natural resources. The Internet is anticipated to remain 
an essential tool for insurgencies in soliciting financial revenue, generating political 
support, and developing propaganda. As of August 2016, only 42 percent of the global 
population are web users,411 leaving 58 percent as potential future Internet users who 
could increase an IS target-support segmentation. 
Globalization and revenue from natural resources have changed the way 
insurgencies operate as states come to depend on each other more through commerce and 
foreign investment. Increased globalization has also allowed for more relaxed borders. 
These relaxed borders can support an insurgency through safe havens and transit, making 
financial resources available, and giving insurgents access to indirect political and 
military support. Natural resource revenue has supported IS in becoming the most 
lucrative insurgency as of August 2016. This has allowed IS to forgo private donations, 
which come with demands on an insurgency’s direction and goals. 
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1. Safe Haven and Transit 
As noted in Chapter II, Section C3, the State Department has acknowledged that 
IS has relied on weak borders allowing safe haven and transit to facilitate movement of 
goods and people, as did the FLN and NVA, but they are less dependent on weak borders 
than prior insurgencies were for the transfer of funds. The continuing phenomenon of 
failed states also offers safe haven and transit opportunities.  
Safe haven and transit played a significant role in both the French–Algerian War 
and Vietnam War. During the French–Algerian War, Morocco and Tunisia, who did not 
join the UN until 1956, were hostile to French interests. The weak borders allowed the 
FLN to receive external support, while the French could not advance into these 
neighboring states. The Morice Line only temporarily contained Algeria. During the 
Vietnam War, safe haven and transit were the deciding factors. The NVA built the robust 
Ho Chi Minh Trail that skirted inside Laos and Cambodia, alongside the Vietnam border. 
The Ho Chi Minh Trail shuttled vehicles, equipment, arms, and personnel for the NVA 
into South Vietnam.  
Today, borders appear to be relevant in funneling foreign recruitment and 
essential supplies for IS. Borders are weakened by the expansion of globalization. As the 
world moves from nation-states toward a global presence (fractal governments), as 
described by Thomas Frey, this will initially require relaxed borders to support 
globalization.412 These relaxed borders make states susceptible to foreign fighter 
recruitments and the shipment of arms and crucial supplies to sustain an insurgency.  
Failed states have also contributed to weak borders and the existence of safe 
havens. As states move toward failed-state status, international investment ceases, 
unemployment rises, and populations become less satisfied with leaders, dictators, or 
presidents. This can create an environment that is inviting to a newly developed 
insurgency. As that insurgency intensifies its violence, the diaspora population will 
increase, as seen recently in Iraq and Syria. This flow of refugees leads to conditions that 
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allow insurgencies to shuttle external support. Insurgencies will continue to depend on 
the weakness of neighboring borders to transport personnel and equipment.  
Understanding how safe havens and transit function for IS can inform COIN 
efforts. To reduce safe haven and transit, strong, developed states must continue to invest 
in state-building strategies to prevent failed states. Diplomacy can be used to shore up 
fragile states by discouraging sectarian leadership and encouraging social services and 
just, government-enforced law and order for the local population. As long as the free flow 
of insurgencies across failed-state borders continues, IS will have access to safe havens 
and transit. 
2. Financial Resources 
Financial resources have evolved for IS from a grassroots strategy similar to the 
FLN’s toward a heterogeneous strategy involving both a global Internet-enabled support 
structure and internally generated revenue. The FLN had to depend on cash from other 
states to support their insurgency, grassroots networks, international connections, and 
diasporas. The NVA were able to receive financial support from procommunist countries 
like the Soviet Union and the PRC. This grassroots approach to donations limited the 
FLN’s and NVA’s financial revenues to their pre-Internet eras. 
The current transition into the information age has aided IS’s financial network, 
which utilizes Internet-driven funds. Their financial network is constantly innovating new 
techniques, finding loopholes in international regulations, and updating security 
measures. As more people come to use the Internet, IS could benefit financially.  
Self-generated financial resources have developed since the 1950s. The FLN 
depended on taxes, donations, and extortion for their organic financial network. The 
NVA was able to use donations as a self-generated funding method. IS also uses these 
resources, along with criminal activity, to fund external support.413 Unlike the FLN and 
the NVA, IS has managed to become financially self-sustaining, most significantly by 
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selling natural resources (agriculture, cement, phosphate, natural gas, and oil).414 Their 
internal resources have earned IS several million dollars per day, with oil sales the major 
contributor.415 One predictable IS trend is that use of taxes, donations, and criminal 
activities will continue, but natural resources will eventually be depleted. 
There are a variety of ways to counter IS’s financial network. A desirable counter 
operation would be to target isolated Internet users and black market sales supporting IS 
and to simultaneously run developed psychological operations (PSYOP). Blocking 
monetary transactions over the Internet could cripple IS. Their black market selling of 
natural resources could be targeted and blocked through UN sanctions. Finally, a PSYOP 
through dropped leaflets over IS sanctuary cities could coerce individuals to flee. This 
could deprive IS of extortion and tax revenue, along with personnel to maintain the daily 
tasks necessary for operating natural resource revenue. An attack on IS’s internally 
generated financial revenue must be executed precisely, to avoid a humanitarian issue 
among the local population in sanctuary cities. 
3. Political Support 
Global inequalities between states during the Cold War created political 
opportunities for insurgencies. The PRC and Cuba were in favor of supporting state and 
non-state actors to expand communism, so they gave the FLN international support; 
along with the Soviet Union, they repeated this political support for the NVA. During the 
French–Algerian War, Morocco and Tunisia did not agree with colonial traditions and 
favored Islamic principles, leading them to openly support the FLN. The FLN’s and 
NVA’s political support allowed direct and indirect political pressure on the state actors 
opposing them. IS, unlike the FLN or NVA, has not had political support, but instead has 
strived for indirect or covert political support and non-state-actor support. 
Political support for insurgencies has evolved over the years, with the end of Cold 
War (1947–1991) and the expansion of globalization; the majority of states seek to 
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appear cooperative with global security concerns. The expansion of the global 
community has also shifted the landscape of political support. UN membership has 
drastically changed from the Cold War era to present day; there were just 76 members in 
1955 and 193 members in 2011, out of 196 countries. This change also contributed to 
globalization; as economist Thomas Friedman stated, the world has become “flat.”416 
Globalization has allowed for simplicity of free trade on open markets, and countries fear 
global repercussions if they provide direct overt political support to unjustifiable state or 
non-state actors. IS’s excessive use of brutality has also affected the kind of political 
support they receive. This is partly why IS is currently only receiving indirect state and 
non-state-actor support.  
There are a few options to block IS from gaining political support from Sunni 
states. A feasible counter operation to political support would be building strong state 
alliances through diplomacy and supporting the development of fragile states. Alliances 
could deter states from acting against a supporting state’s interests. Developing fragile 
states could also prevent opportunities for non-state actors to emerge and support IS 
through funding, equipment, propaganda, foreign fighters, or HUMINT. 
4. Propaganda 
Propaganda has changed vastly over the years due to Internet usage and software 
innovations. The FLN used basic forms of radio, printed handbills, and other traditional 
forms of media. The brutal actions of the French Army in Algeria and the press coverage 
of the Vietnam War indirectly supported the FLN’s and NVA’s propaganda messages. 
The French Army’s inhumane interrogation techniques and excessive use of violence 
against civilians became talking points in the UN, reports of which educated the 
international community on the atrocities taking place in Algeria. During the Vietnam 
War, news media on GI deaths, the Tet Offensive, and alleged American war crimes 
indirectly supported the NVA through propaganda. The French and United States’ 
                                                 
416 “[G]lobalization has made the world ‘flat’ removing many of the traditional barriers and obstacles 
that separate states and markets from each other.” Patrick O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski, “Chapter 11: 
Globalization,” in Essential Readings in Comparative Politics, 4th ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2012), 588. 
 102 
aggressive actions during the French–Algerian War and Vietnam War can be understood 
through Merom, who stated that the domestic structures of democracies depend on the 
“crucial role played by the society and culture of the strong [democratic] contender.”417 
IS has managed to expand its propaganda techniques by using the Internet to 
reach millions of web users globally. This has allowed IS to instantly send photos, 
videos, and updates of current battles while manipulating the messages with sophisticated 
software to present an IS utopia. IS’s violence has prevented journalists from entering 
their strongholds, forcing Western nations to rely solely on IS propaganda, confiscated 
documents, or defected jihadi fighters to gather IS intelligence.  
Western countries are playing catchup with antipropaganda campaigns against IS. 
These techniques were last frequently used during the Cold War. The United States 
Information Agency (USIA) (1953–1999) was designed to influence foreign policies to 
support U.S. interests and was disbanded following the end of the Cold War. An 
antipropaganda campaign has been difficult due to both the democratic value of freedom 
of speech and easily accessible mobile devices. A counterstrategy utilizing a PSYOP plan 
could be executed through white, gray, or black propaganda (see footnote) to confuse or 
disseminate the truth about IS.418 The strength of propaganda for IS is likely to continue 
unless the global community realizes its magnitude. A counterpropaganda campaign 
could be developed on a global scale, but would require relinquishing some common 
democratic freedoms.  
5. Direct [to Indirect] Military Support 
IS, unlike the FLN and NVA, has not benefited from direct military support, 
relying instead on indirect military support by confiscated and illegally procured means. 
Past insurgencies have received direct state support, particularly during the Cold War—
for example during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when the Soviet Union shipped 
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ballistic missiles into Cuba prior to the 13-day Missile Crisis.419 The FLN had direct 
military support from state actors, buying weapons from China and the Soviet Union to 
support their insurgency. The NVA had direct military support from the Soviet Union, 
China, North Korea, and Cuba. However, similar to the way political support for 
insurgencies has dwindled, the end of the Cold War led to a decline in direct military 
support. 
Although IS has not received direct military support, they have managed to 
generate an arsenal by confiscating government armories, commandeering direct 
weapons acquisitions after successful battles, and possibly acquiring weapons covertly 
from states or non-state actors when FTF enter the IS sanctuary and transport military 
supplies. To counter indirect military support for insurgencies, alliances must be formed 
among states to enhance international relations. Diplomacy could encourage weak states 
to maintain better control over stockpiles of military equipment. State-building relations 
could also deter weak states from illegally selling military equipment. 
B. ANSWERING RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Can the French–Algerian War and the Vietnam War help identify patterns 
and areas of vulnerability in the external support IS currently receives? 
Evaluating the three case studies simultaneously has helped to identify recurring 
IS trends and potentially fragile areas of external support that can be targeted in counter-
IS operations. IS has made use of the benefits of safe haven and transit, financial support, 
and propaganda, much in the manner the FLN and NVA did, and these constitute the key 
areas of vulnerability. Political support and direct military support have not played overt 
roles, unlike with the FLN and NVA, and therefore represent more challenging areas of 
external support to target.  
Safe havens and transit and propaganda are important trends and areas of 
vulnerability in all three case studies. Safe havens will continue to remain important for 
IS for foreign fighter recruitment, insurgency expansion, local population support, 
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extortion practices, and selling intrastate natural resources. All the IS benefits of safe 
haven and transit could be eliminated with secure borders and the development of robust 
states with just police and military forces to maintain law and order while preventing 
insurgency from developing. 
All three insurgencies used propaganda to disseminate their grievances through a 
perceived narrative, to influence foreign fighter recruitment, to extract financial aid, and 
to acquire political and indirect military support. IS has even used propaganda to inspire 
foreign terrorist attacks in at least 21 countries as of July 2016.420 As IS now uses the 
Internet as their main avenue to disseminate propaganda and to communicate, it presents 
a single point of vulnerability. If countries and social media companies could cooperate 
to pursue a common enemy, targeting and eliminating IS propaganda could be possible. 
Different financial support methods appear in the IS case study than in the FLN 
and NVA studies, but vulnerabilities have existed in all three cases. The FLN and NVA 
primarily relied on currency being shuttled across their borders. IS, in contrast, has 
developed a robust financial infrastructure and primarily relies on selling intrastate 
natural resources and moving monetary funds via the Internet. This has allowed IS to be 
self-sustaining and to forgo donations. As IS loses territory, they are deprived of natural 
resource revenue. IS has also developed very sophisticated means of moving monetary 
funds in and out of their sanctuary territory. This does present areas of vulnerability, but 
it could also create humanitarian issues if targeted, which could indirectly strengthen an 
IS propaganda message.  
Direct military and political support are more difficult for IS to obtain than they 
were for the FLN and NVA. Diplomatic means have deterred states from directly 
supporting an IS insurgency with military aid or overt political support. IS offers little to 
coerce states into abandoning alliances to support it, aside from offering monetary funds 
and natural resources. Neither military aid nor political support are areas that can be 
easily targeted in COIN operations. 
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2. Are the five external support elements discussed in this thesis (safe haven 
and transit, financial resources, political support, propaganda, and direct [to 
indirect] military support) still relevant to modern non-state actors like IS?  
Since the 2001 RAND book titled Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent 
Movements was published, elements of external support have evolved for insurgencies. 
Safe haven and transit, financial support, and propaganda are still relevant to IS. 
Although the means of using these things have changed, they will continue to remain 
essential for insurgencies.  
Political and direct military support appear not to be relevant to IS’s external 
support. Indirect and/or covert support through political and military means has become 
more common for IS, while direct and/or overt assistance was more common for the FLN 
and NVA. The information age, dispersed support, and non-state actors have contributed 
to this shift. The information age has allowed IS to instantly communicate bidirectionally 
with individuals and groups globally to generate dispersed support, which contributes to 
non-state-actor support, making it extremely difficult to implement COIN operations 
simultaneously across multiple regions. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis established the patterns, vulnerabilities, and relevance of IS external 
support as defined in the 2001 RAND book titled Trends in Outside Support for 
Insurgent Movements. The answers to the research questions hopefully show the 
importance of analyzing insurgency means of external support and provide a starting 
point for future research. Follow-on research might consider using regressions to analyze 
quantitative and qualitative measures of means of external support. Continued research 
could also determine if IS’s external supporters can be coerced into becoming external 
detractors. Finally, a proximity-model approach of insurgency support could be evaluated 
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